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Abstract
This paper studies the link between local public spending and popular
support and investigates its persistence across institutional transitions
and over the long term. I explore the foundation of Mussolini’s New
Towns (Citta` di Fondazione) in Fascist Italy, a major infrastructure invest-
ment which played a central role in the fascist propaganda. Employing
municipality-level data before and after the intervention, together with
information on the timing of each New Town construction, I find that
the intervention enhanced the electoral support for the Fascist Party, fa-
voring the emergence of the Regime. Furthermore, I document a posi-
tive link between the New Towns and the electoral support for the Neo-
Fascist Party, which persisted until the present day. Using individual
survey data, I document that respondents near the Fascist New Towns
built 70 years ago currently display political attitudes in line with the
fascist ideology. Results are not driven by the geographic conditions
that induced the location of the New Towns, socioeconomic differences,
and migration patterns. Furthermore, I find no spurious effect of the
New Towns that were planned but not built. The findings suggest that
public spending may have long-lasting effects on political and cultural
attitudes, which persist across major institutional changes.
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1 Introduction
Public spending can buy popular support. In democracies, politi-
cal leaders may allocate public resources to increase the probability of
getting re-elected. In non-democratic regimes, public spending may be
used to stabilize the regime. Overall, a growing body of evidence sug-
gests that public resources can be allocated to boost popular support and
influence electoral choices.1
Government transfers, for instance, have been shown to enhance the
electoral support for the incumbent (Levitt and Snyder Jr, 1997; Man-
acorda et al., 2011). Furthermore, a growing literature points toward
the significant effect of infrastructure investments in boosting local elec-
toral support (Drazen and Eslava, 2010; Voigtlaender and Voth, 2014;
Huet-Vaughn, 2019). Such findings invite questions on the mechanisms
through which these effects unfold. While local public spending may
buy votes, it may also influence citizens’ political opinions and beliefs.
Yet, empirically assessing whether political opinions and beliefs play a
role is challenging because such a mechanism typically coexists with the
vote-buying one.
This paper sheds light on this issue by studying infrastructures built
by the Italian Fascist Regime and investigating whether their effect on
local popular support persisted after the end of the dictatorship, when
the vote-buying channel became irrelevant. I explore the case of Mus-
solini’s New Towns (Citta` di Fondazione): a major infrastructure invest-
ment undertaken by the Italian Fascist Regime from 1922 until the early
1940’s. Fascistville (Littoria) and Mussolinia are two of the 147 New
Towns built by the Regime on the Italian peninsula. I present three
main findings. First, the foundation of the New Towns enhanced the
local political support for the Fascist Party. Second, such an effect per-
sisted through democratization, favoring the emergence and persistence
of the Neo-Fascist Party. Third, the Fascist New Towns explain differ-
1 See, for instance, Levitt and Snyder Jr (1997); Manacorda et al. (2011); Curto-Grau
et al. (2012); Quintana-Domeque (2012); Voigtlaender and Voth (2014); Adena et al.
(2015); Cinnirella and Schueler (2017); Galofre´-Vila` et al. (2017). I discuss the litera-
ture in more detail below.
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ences in current political and cultural attitudes that can be traced back
to the Fascist ideology. The findings suggest that public spending may
have long-lasting effects on political and cultural attitudes, which per-
sist across major institutional changes.
An extensive program of land reclamation of malarial swamplands
was instrumental for Mussolini to show the economic and technological
competence of the regime. As the Fascist Party advertised, the drainage
of the swamps was an achievement of the Fascist government that nei-
ther the Roman Empire nor the Church had been able to achieve. On the
newly reclaimed land, the Regime built the New Towns. The founda-
tion of a modern city built from swamplands was crucial in the Fascist
propaganda and resonated internationally (Ghirardo, 1989; Kargon and
Molella, 2008).2
Towers shaped like the emblem of Fascism (Torri Littorie) andmajestic
buildings as headquarters of the Fascist Party (Case del Fascio) dominated
the centers of the New Towns. While they were modern centers, their
layout was inspired by the cities of the Roman Empire. Designed to
stimulate a process of identification of the masses based on the collective
historical memory of the Roman Empire, the New Towns were designed
to instill the idea that Fascism was building on, and improving upon, the
imperial Roman past (Ghirardo, 1989; Nicoloso, 2012).
I conduct the empirical analysis by employing a rich data-set at the
level of Italian municipalities. I use novel data on the location of the
Fascist New Towns, the historical presence of malarial swamps, as well
as data from several censuses. I trace the evolution of the political envi-
ronment from 1921 (before the intervention) until 1992 employing data
on electoral outcomes from Corbetta and Piretti (2009). I combine the
municipality-level data with contemporary individual-level survey on
political and cultural values from the Italian National Election Studies
(ITANES).
In the first step of the empirical analysis, I investigate whether the
2 The New Towns were also built to “ruralize” the country and slowdown migration to
large urban center. Such measures are often adopted to reduce accountability and the
threat of rebellion (Campante and Do, 2014).
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construction of the New Towns was effective in fostering the entrench-
ment of the dictatorship. I document that areas near the Fascist New
Towns experienced a larger increase in the electoral support for the Fas-
cist Party between the elections of 1921 and 1924. Importantly, they did
not exhibit larger electoral support for the Party before the intervention.
In the second step of the empirical analysis, I turn to investigate how
long-lasting the effect of the New Towns was. I study the link between
the Fascist New Towns and the electoral support for the Neo-Fascist
Party (MSI - Italian Social Movement). The Party emerged in the postwar
period and advocated political and ideological positions directly rooted
in the Fascist Regime, in turn providing a unique opportunity to inves-
tigate the political legacy of Italian Fascism. I document that areas near
the Fascist New Towns displayed significantly larger electoral support
for the Neo-Fascist party which persisted from its onset in 1948 until its
dissolution in 1992.
Given that the New Towns were mainly built in areas historically
characterized by malarial swamps, their location was predetermined
with respect to the political process. Yet, it is possible that the geo-
graphic characteristics that induced the location of the New Towns had
an independent effect on the adoption of the Fascist ideology. To mini-
mize this concern, I employ two strategies.
First, I look at New Towns that were planned but not built. Consistent
with the hypothesis, I find that municipalities in those areas did not dis-
play larger support for the Fascist Party or, after the end of the Regime,
for the Neo-Fascist Party. Second, in investigating the short-run effect of
the New Towns, I compare the difference in the 1924 electoral support
for the Fascist Party between the municipalities treated right before the
1924 elections and the untreated ones with the difference between the
municipalities treated right after the 1924 elections and the untreated
ones. Such an approach has two advantages. First, it provides an es-
timate of the effect of the New Towns on the electoral support for the
Fascist Party which is unaffected by potential bias due to the location of
the New Towns. Second, it provides an estimate of the bias, which is sta-
tistically insignificant and opposite in sign to the coefficient of interest.
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Proximity to the New Towns built in the Fascist era (1922-45) can ex-
plain differences in the electoral support for the Fascist (or Neo-Fascist)
Party which lasted more than 70 years. Thus the effect of the New Towns
persisted throughout the democratic transition, and over a long period
of time. Such finding suggests that the vote-buying channel is unlikely
to be a viable explanation.
An influential body of works emphasizes that historical events can
affect cultural and political attitudes. Nunn and Wantchekon (2011),
for instance, show that the historical traumatic experience of African
slavery persistently influenced cultural norms. Recent works show the
effects of historical “shocks” on political attitudes. For instance, Fontana
et al. (2016) study the persistent effect of the Nazi occupation of Italy;
Acharya et al. (2016) explore the legacy of American slavery. Narciso
and Severgnini (2016) highlight the effect of the Irish famine. Even if
beliefs may change, once they are instilled, they can be very persistent
(Voigtla¨nder and Voth, 2012; Guiso et al., 2016). I conjugate these views
in the context of the New Towns and advance the hypothesis that such
a major investment in infrastructure undertaken by the Fascist Govern-
ment generated a more favorable view of Fascism and its tenets, which
persisted across democratization and in the long run.
I test this hypothesis by employing contemporary survey data on po-
litical and cultural attitudes. I find that individuals near the New Towns
built more than 70 years ago currently display preferences in favor of the
fascists, for a stronger leader in politics, for nationalism, and for racism
— the central ideological principles of the Fascist Regime. The analysis
of cohort-level heterogeneity for individuals who lived under the dicta-
torship or were school-aged children in those years is in line with the
hypothesis of the political and cultural legacy of the New Towns.
I assess the robustness of the results to a host of potentially con-
founding factors, including the determinants of the location of the New
Towns (such as the presence of malarial swamps), various measures of
population and market access (Harris, 1954b), and other policies such
as the Battle for Grain (Carillo, 2018), and the emphasis of the Fascist
Regime on the agricultural sector. The results are robust to excluding
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municipalities within 20 kilometers from the New Towns, which had
faster population growth during the Fascist Regime, most likely due to
in-migration. Using individual data, I also show robustness to directly
controlling for migration. These findings do not support the hypothesis
of migration as a key mechanism.
This research mainly contributes to three strands of the literature.
First, the emphasis of this paper on the persistent effect of historical pol-
icy interventions on political attitudes provides novel evidence on the
long-term influence of historical events on political attitudes (Acharya
et al., 2016; Fontana et al., 2016; Narciso and Severgnini, 2016), cul-
tural traits (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011), and behavior (Fouka and
Voth, 2013). As well as to works that study the coevolution of culture
and institutions (Alesina and Giuliano, 2015; Becker et al., 2016; Bisin
and Verdier, 2017; Lecce et al., 2017; Lowes et al., 2017; Grompone and
Sessa, 2016).
Second, by showing that policy interventions undertaken by auto-
cratic regimes may have long-term effects on political attitudes, this
research complements a growing body of literature on the effects of
political regimes on political preferences and beliefs. For instance,
Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln (2007) show that exposure to communism
in East Germany influenced preferences for redistribution; Voigtla¨nder
and Voth (2015) highlight the persistent effects of the Nazi indoctrina-
tion on antisemitic beliefs; Xue and Koyama (2016) show that political
repressions during autocratic rule had persistent negative effects on so-
cial capital. A paper close to this one is Martinez-Bravo et al. (2017),
which finds that the effect of Suharto’s autocracy on elite capture per-
sisted through democratization. This paper contributes to this view by
emphasizing a complementary mechanism of the persistent effect of au-
tocratic institutions on political attitudes, which may influence the func-
tioning of future democratic institutions.
Finally, while a large body of works has shown that public spend-
ing can buy electoral support (Levitt and Snyder Jr, 1997; Manacorda
et al., 2011; Huet-Vaughn, 2019), this paper contributes by evidencing
that such an effect can persist. It suggests that the effect of policy on the
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formation of beliefs (as explored in Di Tella et al. (2007)) is persistent,
thus contributing to the broad literature that studies the long-lasting
consequences of policy interventions (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Murphy
et al., 1989; Carillo, 2018)
2 Historical Background
2.1 The Emergence of the Fascist Party
Albeit seemingly of little significance at that time, the event that oc-
curred in Milan on March 23, 1919 would shape the history of Europe.
Previously excluded from the socialist party (PSI) because of his inter-
ventionist and nationalistic views, a journalist named Benito Mussolini
formed a new political movement called Italian Fasci of Combat. The
Fasci were composed of people from different social classes and political
views brought together by the principles of war interventionism and na-
tionalistic ideology (Leoni, 1971; Lyttelton, 2004). The elections of 1921
saw the onset of Mussolini’s Party in the national political scene. Only
one year later, he marched on Rome with his followers to become prime
minister. The consolidation of Mussolini’s power occurred with the last
free elections of 1924. One year later, the dictatorship was officially de-
clared and all other parties were outlawed.
2.2 The Foundation of Mussolini’s New Towns
For centuries, the Roman empire had tried without success to drain
the malarial swamplands. After a major program of land reclamation,
“where Caesars had fallen short il Duce prevailed” (Kargon and Molella,
2008, p. 50). The control over the newly available land was heavily ad-
vertised and further established through the construction of the Fascist
New Towns.
Mussolini started the foundation of New Towns with the aim to extol
Italy’s power to the rest of the World and stimulate nationalistic senti-
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ments and political support for the Fascist Party across citizens. “The
New Towns were of enormous propaganda significance for the govern-
ment, whose ability to produce functioning towns from swamplands in
a very short time, almost by magic, certainly enhanced the propaganda
value of the reclamation” (Ghirardo, 1989, p.26).
For decades, there was little knowledge of the extensiveness of phe-
nomenon of the Fascist New Towns. The historical literature predomi-
nantly dealt with the area of the Pontine Marshes, south-east of Rome,
and there was limited knowledge of New Towns built in the rest of
the Country. Recently, Pennacchi and Caracciolo (2003) and Pennac-
chi (2008) present an inventory of the Fascist New Towns, which builds
upon previous works including Protasi and Sonnino (2003). The Fascist
New Towns were 147 centers built from 1922 until 1943. Figure 1 shows
the location of the Fascist New Towns. It also depicts malaria prevalence
in 1870. Consistent with the historical literature, the figure suggests that
the presence of malarial swamps was a key factor in explaining the loca-
tion of the New Towns.
2.3 The Onset of the Neo-Fascist Party
After the Second World War and the end of the dictatorship, the Ital-
ian political scene saw the emergence of the MSI (Italian Social Move-
ment). Founded in 1946 by the veterans of Mussolini’s republic (RSI-
Italian Social Republic), the party became one of the largest in Italy
and “possibly the strongest Neo-Fascist Party in the advanced industrial
countries” (Ferraresi, 1988).
The Party founded its roots in the ideology of the regime. The ideolog-
ical principles emphasized by the Fascist regime were centered around
the importance of hierarchy and obedience to the leader and national-
istic views. These principles were inherited by the Neo-Fascist Party
(Ferraresi, 1988). The ideological proximity between the Fascist Regime
and the Neo-Fascist Party provides a unique opportunity to investigate
the ideological legacy of Italian Fascism in the postwar political envi-
ronment and leverage novel evidence on the persistence effects of public
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Figure 1: Malaria Prevalence in 1870 and the Location of the Fascist New
Towns
Notes: The map shows that the location of the New Towns was predominantly explained by the presence of
malarial swamps.
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spending allocation on political attitudes.
3 Data
This section describes the data employed in the empirical analysis.
Overall, the data cover more than 7000 municipalities over a period
of almost century, which are combined with contemporary survey data
for more than 3000 respondents, together with geographic information
data. In a significant portion, historical data have digitized from pri-
mary sources. In the following, I briefly describe the main variables and
sources. For more detailed information about the data, see appendix E.
3.1 Municipality-level Data
3.1.1 Electoral Data
This research investigates the long-lasting shadow of the Fascist New
Towns on electoral outcomes and political attitudes. Electoral outcomes
are given by the share of votes received by a political party in the polit-
ical elections for the Chamber of Deputies. The political parties consid-
ered are the Fascist Party, before and during the New Towns construc-
tion, and the Neo-Fascist Party, for the period after the end of the dicta-
torship. Electoral data are from Corbetta and Piretti (2009).
For the fascist period, voting records cover more than 2000 munici-
palities at the 1921 and 1924 elections. The Fascist Party took part to
the 1921 elections as a part of larger political entities (i.e. lists). Such
lists are indicated in the official electoral national statistics3 and in Leoni
(1971) (see appendix). I measure the 1921 popular support for the Fas-
cist Party by employing the share of votes for such lists. As I show in the
following, the validity of such an approach is empirically supported by
the positive and strong correlation between such a measure the share of
3 Statistica delle Elezioni Generali Politiche per la XXVI Legislatura (15 Maggio 1921),
Ministero dell’Economia Nazionale - Direzione Generale di Statistica, 1924.
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votes for the Fascist Party in 1924, year in which the Party took part to
the election as an independent political entity.
For the period after the dictatorship, I employ voting records across
more than 7000 municipalities. Electoral outcomes after the dictator-
ship are given by the share of votes for the Neo-Fascist Party (the MSI:
Movimento Sociale Italiano) at 11 elections from 1948 (the first elections
in which the Neo-Fascist Party was admitted to the polls) until the 1992
elections. After 1992, the scandals that affected the Italian political envi-
ronment caused the dissolution of most political parties in their original
form, including the Neo-Fascist Party.
3.1.2 Main Control Variables
To minimize concerns on the effect of potentially confounding fac-
tors, in the empirical analysis I control for a host of observable charac-
teristics. I take into account geographic differences across municipali-
ties including measures of elevation and distance to water. I calculate
the municipality-level average suitability for agriculture (measured by
the Caloric Suitability Index by Galor and O¨zak (2015)) and for produc-
ing wheat (from the Food and Agricultural Organization, Global Agro-
Ecological Zones). The suitability data, which are originally in raster
form, have been averaged within the boundary of each municipality.
I take into account differences in the prevalence of (or suitability for)
malaria, in population over time, in market access before the interven-
tion, and in the distance to the closest major urban centers.
3.2 Individual-level Survey Data
I investigate the role of political and cultural attitudes in explaining
the persistent effect of the New Towns on electoral outcomes. I mea-
sure differences in political attitudes and cultural values using individ-
ual survey data from the Italian National Election Studies (ITANES) for
the years 2001, 2004, and 2008. The surveys provide several survey
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questions which I use to get a sense on whether individual political pref-
erences are close to the Fascist tenet. I employ measures of nationalism,
preferences for a stronger leader in politics, and others. The surveys
also provide an extensive set demographic characteristics, information
on migration within the country, socioeconomic status of the respondent
and of the respondent’s parents, and more. I employ these information
as control variables in the empirical analysis.
4 Empirical Framework
In this section, I empirically investigate the importance of the Fas-
cist New Towns in explaining differences in the support for the Fascist
ideology which persisted into the transition to democracy and until to-
day. Before showing the econometric analysis, I graphically illustrate the
main findings.
Figure 2 depicts the electoral support for the Neo-Fascist Party in
1992 and the location of the New Towns, which were built about 70
years before during the Italian Fascist Regime. As evident from the map,
larger support for the Neo-Fascist Party is associated with proximity to
the New Towns. This is particularly evident in the Lazio region, where
several New Towns were built, as well as the Apulia region, West Sar-
dinia, and the North-East. To better visualize the relationship between
proximity to the New Towns and the support for the Neo-Fascist Party,
figure 3 depicts the average share of votes for the Neo-Fascist Party for
different distance intervals to the closest New Town. As evident from the
figure, distance to the closest New Town is negatively associated with the
support for the Neo-Fascist Party. Such a negative relationship is consis-
tent with the hypothesis that the Fascist New Towns influenced political
choices in favor of Italian Fascism, which persisted over the long term.
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Figure 2: Mussolini’s New Towns and the Electoral Support for the Neo-Fascist
Party in 1992.
Notes: This figure shows the share of votes for the Neo-Fascist Party in 1992 and the location of the Fascist
New Towns.
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Figure 3: Support for the Neo-Fascist Party in 1992 by distance to the New
Towns
Notes: This figure shows the share of votes for the Neo-Fascist Party in 1992 for different distance intervals
to the closest New Town.
4.1 New Towns and the Support for the Fascist Party
In the following, I investigate whether the construction of the New
Towns was effective in boosting the support for the Fascist Party, in turn
favoring the emergence of the dictatorship.
The first constructions of the Fascist New Towns started in 1922, year
in which Mussolini became prime minister. Therefore, prior to 1922,
there is no reason to believe that the New Towns should have a posi-
tive effect on the support for the Fascist Party. Figure 4a shows a binned
scatter plot of the electoral support for the Fascist Party in 1921 and the
distance to the closest New Town. As evident from the figure, the rela-
tionship between these two variable is not negative. Actually, it is pos-
itive. Meaning that areas in the proximity of the New Towns exhibited
a lower support for the Fascist Party. Thus the Fascist government built
the New Towns in areas were the support for the Party was lower. Such
a selection rule may, if anything, underestimate the actual link between
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the New Towns and the support for the Fascist Party in later periods.
In contrast, figure 4b shows the hypothesized negative link between the
electoral support for the Fascist Party in 1924 and the distance to the
New Towns. Yet, only a subset of the New Towns were built before 1924.
For 83% of the New Towns information on the year in which their
construction was initiated are available (for the others the year is either
uncertain or missing). Thus, I can investigate their link with the elec-
toral support for the Fascist Party in 1924 and the minimum distance to
the New Towns which were built on or before 1924, the year of the elec-
tions.4 As depicted in panel 4c the link between the electoral support for
the Fascist Party in 1924 and the distance to the New Towns that were
under construction up to 1924 is negative. In addition, it is steeper then
in panel 4b, were all the New Towns are considered.
Table 1 shows more formally the empirical analysis graphically de-
picted in figure 4. Column 1, shows, as a placebo, the coefficient of
a regression of the electoral support for the Fascist Party in 1921 (be-
fore the New Towns) and the distance to the closest New Town. The
estimated coefficient is positive. Column 2 shows that, in line with the
hypothesis, the estimated coefficient is negative and statistically signifi-
cant when employing the relevant outcome: the electoral support for the
Fascist Party in 1924. Column 3 restricts the sample of the New Towns
to those already under construction in 1924. In line with the hypothesis,
the estimated coefficient is negative and highly significant. As a falsifica-
tion test, I employ as an explanatory variable the distance to the closest
New Town that was initiated after 1924. Thus, column 4 distinguish
between the distance to the New Towns under construction in 1924 (or
before) and the distance to those initiated after 1924. Consistent with
the advanced hypothesis, only the distance to the relevant New Towns
is statistically significant.5 Finally, in column 5, I regress the electoral
4 Such an analysis will be performed more formally in the following. In addition, in
the appendix table B8, I show evidence that the results are not driven by the New
Towns for which information on the year of the construction is unavailable.
5 The negative sign of the coefficient for the New Towns built after 1924 is due to the
New Towns for which data on the construction year are unavailable. While such a
coefficient becomes positive and insignificant when these New Towns are take into
account, the coefficient of interest remains negative and significant. See column 3,
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Figure 4: The New Towns and the Emergence of the Fascist Party
(a)
(b)
(c)
Notes: The figure show binned scatter plots (100 equally-sized bins). Panel (a) plots the electoral support
for the Fascist Party in 1921 (before the New Towns) against the distance to the closest New Towns. Panel
(b) plots the electoral support for the Fascist Party in 1924 (during the New Towns construction) against the
distance to the closest New Towns. Panel (b) plots the electoral support for the Fascist Party in 1924 against
the distance to the closest New Towns which was initiated on or before 1924. The underlying regression takes
into account population in 1921 (in logs), the presence of malaria, market access controls, and geographic
controls.
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support for the Fascist party in 1924 on the distance to the closest New
Town that was planned but not built. Reassuringly, the estimated co-
efficient is statistically indistinguishable from zero, suggesting that the
estimated coefficient of interest is not due to confounding factors.
In table 2, I investigate the link between the distance to the New
Towns that were already under construction in 1924 and the share of
votes for the Fascist Party in 1924, conditioning on the electoral support
for the Fascists in 1921 and other controls which will be explained be-
low. Column 1 shows the unconditional relationship between these two
variables. The estimated coefficient is negative and statistically signifi-
cant. The coefficient implies that a one standard deviation increase in
the distance to the closest New Town implies 28% of a standard devia-
tion lower support for the Fascist Party in 1924.
Column 2 includes as a control the electoral support for the Fascist
Party in 1921. Thus, the coefficient is an estimate of the link between
the distance to the closest New Town and the change in the support for
the Fascist Party.
Column 3 takes into account the variables that, according to the his-
torical literature, were the major determinants of the location of the Fas-
cist New Towns. In particular, given that the New Towns were built after
land reclamation of areas historically affected by malaria, the disease (or
its eradication) may have induced higher support for the extreme politi-
cal positions of the Fascist Party. Column 3 tackles this issue by control-
ling for an indicator variable that takes value one if the municipality was
affected by malaria in 1871.6 Furthermore, the Fascist government may
have had incentives to locate the New Towns close to areas characterized
by large population and maximize the number of citizens exposed to the
propaganda. To take into account the potentially direct effect of popula-
tion in neighbor municipalities I control for market access in 1921 and
distance to the closest major urban center (see appendix E for variables
appendix table B8.
6 Results are robust to using as a control for malaria the temperature suitability for
the Plasmodium falciparum, the predominant malaria vector on the Italian peninsula
(Snowden, 2008), developed by Gething et al. (2011). See appendix table B9.
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Table 1: The Timing of the New Towns and Electoral Outcomes
Dependent Variables: Share of Votes for the Fascist Party:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1921 1924
Placebo Placebo
Ln (Dist. to NT) 0.2784*** -0.2402***
[0.093] [0.077]
Ln (Dist. to NT until 1924) -0.2858*** -0.2375***
[0.078] [0.080]
Ln (Dist. to NT after 1924) -0.1122
[0.082]
Ln (Dist to Placebo NT) -0.1199
[0.080]
Observations 2,057 2,057 2,057 2,057 2,057
Adjusted R-squared 0.070 0.059 0.099 0.108 0.017
Notes: Observations are at the municipality-level. Standardized coefficients are reported.
See the main text and appendices for variables definitions and sources. Robust standard
errors clustered at the province level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level, * indi-
cates significance at the 10%-level.
1
7
definition and sources).
Column 4 takes into account additional potentially confounding fac-
tors. Over the period of the Fascist dictatorship the Regime emphasized
the role of agricultural production, thus potentially stimulating support
from areas more suitable for agriculture. I take into account this poten-
tially confounding factor by controlling for the Caloric Suitability Index
(Galor and O¨zak, 2015)— a measure of suitability of the soil for agricul-
ture. The Fascist Regime adopted a policy called Battle for Grain which,
by favoring wheat producing areas (Carillo, 2018), may have induced
a local shift in their political support. I take into account this poten-
tially confounding factor by controlling for land suitability for wheat
production. The estimated coefficient is robust to the inclusion of these
controls, further highlighting the importance of the foundation of the
Fascist New Towns in explaining differences in the support for the Fas-
cist Party.
Column 5 controls for geographic conditions that may have been fa-
vorable for the presence of malarial swamps, in turn leading to the lo-
cation of the New Towns. In particular, it includes distance to water,
median elevation, standard deviation of elevation, and elevation range.
The coefficient is unaffected by these additional controls.
Column 6 takes into account the size of the municipality, as measured
by the logarithm of population in 1921 (the year before the advent of
Fascism). The estimated coefficient remains of the hypothesized sign
and statistically significant.
In this section, I have shown that distance to the New Town has the
hypothesized statistical relation with the support for the Fascists only
when the New Towns’ project was ongoing, but not before. Moreover, I
show that only the distance to the New Towns which were under con-
struction on or before 1924 (but not after) are relevant to explain the
support for the Party in 1924. In the following, I dig deeper in the anal-
ysis of the timing of the construction of the New Towns and their link
with the rise of Fascism.
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Table 2: The New Towns and the Electoral Support for the Fascist Party in 1924
Dependent Variable: Share of Votes for the Fascist Party in 1924
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Ln (Dist. to NT until 1924) -0.2858*** -0.3159*** -0.2466*** -0.2488** -0.2573** -0.2517**
[0.078] [0.075] [0.079] [0.094] [0.106] [0.103]
FP ’21 0.1773*** 0.1761*** 0.1720*** 0.1667*** 0.1660***
[0.061] [0.054] [0.056] [0.054] [0.053]
Observations 2,057 2,057 2,057 2,057 2,057 2,057
Adjusted R-squared 0.099 0.132 0.163 0.166 0.174 0.175
Malaria Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market Access Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Agricultural Controls No No No No Yes Yes
Ln Population 1921 No No No No No Yes
Notes: Observations are at the municipality-level. Standardized coefficients are reported. See the
main text and appendices for variables definitions and sources. Robust standard errors clustered at
the province level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level, * indicates signifi-
cance at the 10%-level.
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4.1.1 The Timing of the Treatment
Before digging into the empirical analysis, figure 5 depicts a graphical
representation of the importance of the timing of the New Towns’ con-
struction for the increase in the consensus for the Fascist Party. The fig-
ure depicts the estimated coefficients from regressing the share of votes
for the Fascist Party in 1924 (or 1921) on a set of indicator variables.
Each variable takes value one if a New Town’ construction was initiated
within 30 kilometers (18.6 miles) in each year from 1922 until 1928,
along with an indicator variable taking the construction initiated in any
year after 1928.7 Consider, for instance, the coefficient associated with
the year 1924, which is about 0.13. Meaning that municipalities where
a New Town was initiated in 1924 within 30 kilometers exhibited a 13%
larger electoral support for the Fascist Party in the 1924 elections with
respect to municipalities where no New Town was built within 30 kilo-
meters (i.e. the control group).
Consistent with the advanced hypothesis, figure 5a shows that munic-
ipalities where a New Town was built within 30 kilometers on or before
1924 tend to display larger support in the 1924 elections with respect to
those where the New Towns were built after the elections. Interestingly,
the figure shows a significant difference between 1924 (the year of the
elections) and 1925. If such a difference was due to the construction of
the New Towns, then there should be no positive difference in the sup-
port for the Fascist Party in the 1921 elections, before the onset of the
Fascist project of the New Towns. The hypothesis is supported by the
analysis displayed in figure 5b, which employs as an outcome the elec-
toral support for the Fascist Party in 1921. The comparison of panels
5a and 5b suggests that areas close to the New Towns built on or be-
fore 1924 experienced a positive change in the support for the Fascists,
relative to the control group, which was not exhibited by municipalities
close to the New Towns built on 1925 of afterwards. I turn to the em-
pirical analysis of this hypothesis by estimating the following regression
7 The 30-kilometers cutoff is chosen so as to maximize the t-statistic of the estimated
coefficient of interest —see table B13 and its graphical counterpart depicted in figure
11.
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model
Figure 5: The Timing of the Treatment: Graphical Analysis
(a) Share of Votes for the Fascist Party in 1924
(b) Share of Votes for the Fascist Party in 1921 (Placebo)
Notes: Each figure shows the estimated coefficients from a regression of the share of votes for the Fascist Party
in 1924 (top panel), in 1921 (middle panel), and for the Neo-Fascist Party in 1953, on indicator variables
that take value one if the construction of a New Town was initiated within 30 kilometers in each year. The
regression also includes a dummy that takes vale one is a New Town was built within 30 kilometers in any
year after 1928.
FP24,i = ↵ +  D
30km
(1923−24),i + D
30km
(1923−26),i +✓X+ ✏i (1)
where FP24,i is the share of votes for the Fascist Party in 1924 in mu-
nicipality i, D30km(1923−24),i is an indicator variable that takes value one if
a New Town was built within 30 kilometers from the municipality in
1923 or 1924, whileD30km(1923−26) takes value one if the construction started
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between 1923 and 1926. To restrict the control group to municipali-
ties where no New Towns were built within 30 kilometers, X includes
a dummy taking value one if a New Towns was built within 30 kilome-
ters in any year outside the interval from 1923 to 1926. In addition,
depending on the specification, it includes the electoral support for the
Fascist Party in 1921.8 The coefficient of interest,  , measures whether
there is a significant difference in the difference between municipalities
treated right before the elections (1923 or 1924) and the control group,
versus those treated in 1925 or 1926 and the control group. One of the
advantages of using as a reference the control group lies in estimating
the coefficient   which is an estimate of the selection bias in the location
of the New Towns.9 The results are illustrated in table 3.
Column 1 3 shows the coefficients from estimating equation (1) using
as an outcome the electoral support for the Fascist Party in 1924. In
line with the hypothesis, the estimate of   is positive and statistically
significant. In other words, municipalities exposed to the construction
of the New Towns over the years 1923 and 1924 exhibited more than
65% of a standard deviation larger support for for the Fascist Party with
respect to areas exposed to the New Towns construction right after the
elections. Interestingly, the estimated coefficient for   is negative and
statistically indistinguishable from zero, in turn minimizing concerns
on the presence of a positive bias due to the location of the New Towns.
Column 2 shows that the estimated coefficient of interest increases in
magnitude when controlling for the support for the Fascist Party in the
1921 elections. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that the
construction of the New Towns induced an increase in the electoral sup-
port for the Fascist Party over the period 1921-1924 which is larger than
that of the municipalities that will be treated right after 1924. Moreover,
the statistical insignificance of the estimate of   indicates that such mu-
nicipality exhibited a trend in the support for the Fascist Party which is
statistically similar to the control group.
8Using the difference in the electoral support for the Fascist Party between 1921 and
1924 because these two variables are not directly comparable (see section 3).
9On this point, see Appendix section D.
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Column 3 employs as a placebo outcome the electoral support for the
Fascist Party in 1921. The estimate of   is negative, suggesting that mu-
nicipalities exposed to the New Towns right before the 1924 elections
did not exhibit larger support for the Fascists before the treatment oc-
curred.
The evidence shown in this section supports the hypothesis that the
investment in infrastructure undertaken by the Fascist government in-
fluenced local voting outcomes, favoring the electoral support of the Fas-
cist Party, which ultimately declared openly the dictatorship in 1925, the
year after the elections.
Table 3: The Timing of the Treatment: Regression Analysis
Dependent Variables: Share of Votes for
(1) (2) (3)
Placebo
VARIABLES Fascist Party ’24 FP ’21
D
30km
(1923−24) 0.6573*** 0.7313*** -0.5453**
[0.167] [0.187] [0.249]
D
30km
(1923−26) -0.1792 -0.1338 -0.3341
[0.160] [0.179] [0.257]
FP ’21 Yes
Observations 2,264 2,264 2,264
Adjusted R-squared 0.033 0.052 0.026
Notes: Observations are at the municipality-level. Each re-
gression includes a dummy that takes value one if a New
Town was initiated within 30 kilometers in any other year.
Standardized coefficients are reported. See main text and
appendices for variables definitions and sources. Robust
standard errors clustered at the province level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** indicates signif-
icance at the 5%-level, * indicates significance at the 10%-
level.
4.2 New Towns and the persistence of Neo-Fascism
With the transition to democracy, the Italian political scene saw the
emergence of a Neo-Fascist Party (the MSI). In this section, I explore
whether the Fascist New Towns can explain differences in the support
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for the Neo-Fascist Party in recent periods, when the Fascist Regime is
long gone.
Table 4: Mussolini’s New Towns and the Persistence of the Neo-Fascist Party
Dependent Variable: Share of Votes for Neo Fascist Party in 1992
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln (Dist. to NT) -0.2663*** -0.2159*** -0.2012*** -0.2080*** -0.1773***
[0.050] [0.058] [0.054] [0.054] [0.057]
Ln (Dist to Placebo NT) 0.1469**
[0.066]
Observations 7,438 7,438 7,438 7,438 7,438 7,438
Adjusted R-squared 0.067 0.087 0.118 0.118 0.127 0.127
Malaria Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market Access Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Agricultural Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Population Controls No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: Observations are at the municipality-level. Standardized coefficients are reported. See
the main text and appendices for variables definitions and sources. Robust standard errors
clustered at the province level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level, * indicates
significance at the 10%-level.
Table 4 presents the estimates from regressing the share of votes for
the Neo-Fascist Party in 1992 (the last elections to which the Party par-
ticipated) on the distance to the closest New Town (in logs). Column 1
shows the unconditional relationship between these two variables. As
hypothesized, the coefficient is negative and significant. Column 2 takes
into account the presence of malaria,10 market access in 1921, and dis-
tance to the closest urban center (see appendix E for variables definition
and sources). The coefficient remains negative and highly significant.
Column 3 takes into account suitability for agriculture (the Caloric Suit-
ability Index by Galor and O¨zak (2015)) and for wheat production, to
capture the potentially confounding factor of the Battle for Grain (Car-
illo, 2018). The estimated coefficient is robust to the inclusion of these
controls. Column 4 controls for distance to water, median elevation,
standard deviation of elevation, and elevation range. The coefficient is
10Appendix table B10 shows the robustness to using as a control malaria suitability
rather than actual presence.
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unaffected by these additional controls. Column 5 takes into account
population in 1921 and in 1991. The estimated coefficient remains of
the hypothesized sign and statistically significant. Finally, column 6 em-
ploys as an explanatory variable the distance to New Towns that were
planned but not built. Consistent with the hypothesis, distance to these
sites is not negatively linked to the support for the Neo-Fascist Party.
Actually the estimated coefficient is positive, which suggests that the ef-
fect of potentially confounding is opposite in sign to the coefficient of
interest.
I take into account unobservable characteristics associated with the
location of the New Towns by employing variation across municipalities
that are close to each other and thus similar under several dimensions.
Results are depicted in table 5. Column 1 reports for comparison the
coefficient of the baseline specification from table 4 column 2, in which
I control for the major determinants of the location of the New Towns.
Column 2 takes into account differences in unobservable characteris-
tics across regions by controlling for regional fixed effects.11 The coeffi-
cient remains statistically significant, suggesting that the results are not
driven by heterogeneity across regions.
Migration is a potential explanation of the link between the New
Towns and voting outcomes. For instance, those who populated the New
Towns may have been already in favor of the Fascist ideology. Column
3 excludes municipalities within twenty kilometers (about 12.5 miles)
to the closest New Town. Within this sample differences in population
growth potentially due to differential migration patterns are statistically
insignificant (see section A.5). The coefficient remains large in magni-
tude and statistically significant. Such result does not support the role
of migration as a predominant channel. Yet, in the following section I
will dig deeper into this issue.
If the estimates were driven by areas far away from the New Towns,
11 The regions considered are at the NUTS 1 level and are: Northwest, Northeast, Cen-
tral, South, and Insular Italy. Smaller regions are not appropriate given that, will be
shown in table 5, the distance to the closest New Town becomes particularly relevant
above a 20 km radius.
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concerns on potentially unobserved confounding factors may arise. Col-
umn 4 investigates this aspects excluding municipalities that are more
than 80 kilometers (about 50 miles) from the closest New Town. Re-
markably, the coefficient barely changes, suggesting that the identifying
variation comes from municipalities close to the New Towns rather than
by the low support for Fascism in places that are far away.
To make sure that the use of a continuous measure of distance is not
picking up some unobservable factors, column 5 employs as indepen-
dent variable an indicator variable that takes value one if the New Town
is within 30 kilometers from the closest New Town. Consistent with the
hypothesis, the coefficient is positive and statistically significant, mean-
ing that municipalities within 30 kilometers from the closest New Town
are characterized by 37% of a standard deviation larger support for the
Neo-Fascist Party. The coefficient is robust to the inclusion of regional
fixed effects, as demonstrated in column 6.
Table 5: Mussolini’s New Towns and the Persistence of the Neo-Fascist Party:
Local Variation
Dependent Variable: Share of Votes for Neo Fascist Party in 1992
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Ln (Dist. to NT) -0.2159*** -0.1166** -0.2742*** -0.2568**
[0.058] [0.048] [0.067] [0.120]
NT within 30km 0.3734*** 0.2420***
[0.121] [0.086]
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional FE No Yes No No No Yes
Dist.to NT≥ 20KM No No Yes Yes No No
Dist.to NT∈ [20KM,80KM] No No No Yes No No
Observations 7,438 7,438 6,491 4,094 7,438 7,438
Adjusted R-squared 0.087 0.170 0.078 0.050 0.075 0.171
Notes: Observations are at the municipality-level. Standardized coefficients are reported. See
the main text and appendices for variables definitions and sources. Robust standard errors
clustered at the province level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level, * indicates
significance at the 10%-level.
The results show that the New Towns can predict differences in the
support for the Neo-Fascist Party in 1992. In the following I explore the
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link between the New Towns and the evolution of the electoral support
for the Fascist and Neo-Fascist Party.
Figure 6 illustrates the estimated coefficients from regressing the elec-
toral support for the Fascist Party (1921, 1924) or for the Neo-Fascist
Party (after 1924) on the distance to the closest New Town. Consistent
with the advanced hypothesis, distance to the New Towns is associated
with larger support for the Neo-Fascist Party from its onset (1948) to its
dissolution (1992).
Figure 6: The Evolution of the Support for Fascism and the New Towns
Notes: This figure shows the estimated coefficients, and the 95% confidence intervals,
from a set of regressions of the electoral support for the Fascist Party (1921, 1924) or
for the Neo-Fascist Party (after 1924) on the distance to the closest New Town. The
construction of the New Towns started in 1922. Each regression controls for malaria,
market access controls, and agricultural controls. See appendix E and main text for
variables definition and sources.
4.3 The Fascist New Towns and Political Attitudes
The New Towns built by the Fascist government can explain differ-
ences in voting patterns beyond the end of the dictatorship and until re-
cent periods. Such a finding rises questions on the mechanism through
which such a persistent link unfolded. A growing body of literature
emphasizes that historical events influenced individuals’ beliefs in the
past, thus shaped cultural and political attitudes, which were transmit-
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ted over the long term. This mechanism explains the link between his-
torical and differences in political and cultural attitudes at the present
day. I explore this possibility in the context of the Fascist New Towns.
The local investment undertaken by the Fascist government in build-
ing the New Towns may have shaped individual beliefs toward a more
favorable view of the Fascist government and its tenet, ultimately influ-
encing voting choices even after the end of the Dictatorship. Two pieces
of evidence would support this hypothesis. First, individuals closer to
the Fascist New Towns should display preferences in favor of the fas-
cists. Second, they should exhibit political opinions which are close to
the principles of the Fascist Regime. I explore these possibilities by em-
ploying individual-level survey data.
First, I explore differences in preferences for the fascists by using the
following survey question:12 “There are groups of people whose opin-
ions many people do not like. For each of these groups, tell me if you
think they should be allowed or forbidden to publicly manifest. How
do you think, for example, regarding the fascists?” This same question
is asked for other groups: the communists, the racists, the Muslims, the
homosexuals, and others.13 The answer to the question embeds prefer-
ences for fascism together with preferences for giving the right to man-
ifest. In fact, as shown in appendix table E16, despite the significant
differences in political views between some of these groups, the answers
to the question across groups are positively and significantly correlated.
Yet, there are significant differences in the magnitudes of the correla-
tions, suggesting that these data also contain information on individual
preferences towards each of the groups. Thus, in order to isolate prefer-
ence for the fascists, I have to control for the individual preferences for
giving the right to manifest to everybody.
I employ as an outcome the answer to the question on whether the
fascists should have the right to manifest, controlling for the answers
12 For more information on the data, see appendix section E.
13 The other groups are: who manifests against the President of the Republic; who
manifests against the Pope; who wants the secession of the North from the rest of
Italy.
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to the same question for all other groups. Some of the other groups
may be characterized by political attitudes related (positively or nega-
tively) to the fascist ideology. Thus, controlling for all other answers is
particularly conservative. Furthermore, given that the respondents are
comparing extremist groups, they may be less likely to display by under-
reporting, which may underestimate preferences for fascism. Table 6
illustrates the results.14
Column 1 uses as an outcome the answer on whether the fascists
should have the right to publicly manifest, controlling for the answer
to the same questions for each of the other groups. In line with the hy-
pothesis, respondents located in municipalities close to the New Towns
are more likely to support the fascists relative to all other groups.
Columns from 2 to 8 employ as outcomes the answer to the same
question for each of the other groups, controlling for the answers for
all the remaining ones (including the fascists). Interestingly, the coeffi-
cients from columns 2 to 7 are not statistically significant. The coeffi-
cient in column 8 is positive and statistically significant. The outcome
variable in that case is the answer to the question on whether people who
want the secession of the North from the rest of Italy should be given
the right to manifest. The lower the value of this variable, the stronger
preferences for national unity. The positive and statistically significant
coefficients indicates that proximity to the New Towns implies that re-
spondents are less likely to support secession of the North from the rest
of Italy, thus they display larger support for national unity — a central
element of the fascist ideology.15 The finding in this table supports the
hypothesis that the New Towns influenced preferences for fascists. In
addition, it points to the role of political attitudes an the Fascist ideol-
ogy.
14Within the restricted sample for which these data are available, the median distance
to the closest New Town is about 36 kilometers, the average is about 51 kilometers,
and the standard deviation is about 41.5 kilometers.
15 The estimated coefficient in column 8 of table 6 is statistically significant despite the
fact that the regression takes a measure of preferences for the fascists. Such finding
can be explained by the larger propensity of the respondents to reveal their prefer-
ences for national unity with respect to revealing their preferences for the fascists.
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Table 6: New Towns and Preferences for Fascism
Dependent Variable: Should Have the Right to Publicly Manifest (2004)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Other Groups
Against the Against the Divide
VARIABLES Fascists Communists Muslims Homosexuals Racists President Pope North from South
Ln (Dist. to NT) -0.0395*** 0.0181 0.0027 0.0160 -0.0152 0.0124 -0.0174 0.0638***
[0.013] [0.011] [0.012] [0.012] [0.013] [0.011] [0.012] [0.016]
Municipality Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Migration FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of respondents 1455 1455 1455 1455 1455 1455 1455 1455
# of municipalities 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240
Pseudo R-squared 0.417 0.449 0.396 0.411 0.370 0.451 0.471 0.305
Notes: Observations are at the individual level. The coefficients displayed are the average marginal effects from a Probit regression
weighted using survey weights. All regressions control for whether the respondent is in the same region in which his or her father was
at the age of 14. Municipality controls include the log of population in 2001, distance to the closest capital of the province, a dummy
for the presence of malaria in 1870, a measure of market access in 1921. Migrant dummy takes on value one if the respondent
is in the same region in which his or her father at the age of 14. Individual controls include age, years of education, gender, a
dummy for married, number of children, a dummy for employed, and dummy variables for salaried, self employed, and atypical job.
Additional individual controls include a set of dummies for the sector in which the respondent is employed (agriculture, service,
industry, public administration), a set of dummies for the sector in which his or her father was employed when the respondent was
14 years old, and a set of dummy for the sector in which the head of the household is employed. See the main text and appendices
for variables definitions and sources. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level, * indicates significance at the 10%-level.
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For instance, in the last period of the Regime, the Fascist tenet em-
braced the racist and antisemitic principles. Such viewsmay still present
in the proximity of the New Towns. However, column 5 in table 6 shows
that, by controlling for the support for the fascist group, the respondents
close to the New Towns do not seem to favor the racists. Nevertheless, if
the New Towns positively affected racist views through preferences for
the fascists, then by removing the control variable that captures prefer-
ences for the fascists should make the estimated coefficient negative and
significant. Remarkably, this is indeed verified in table B11.
Second, I explore differences in political opinions and its vicinity to
the Fascist views. For instance, “a central ideological tenet of Fascism
was the cult of the omniscient and omnipotent leader” (Snowden, 2008,
p. 143). Therefore, in areas more exposed to the Fascist New Towns,
individuals may still display preferences in favor of a strong leader in
politics. I investigate this hypothesis in table 7. Column 1 employs as
an outcome the answer to the question on whether the country needs a
strong leader in politics (higher values of the outcome indicate higher
level of respondent’s agreement). The coefficient is negative and signifi-
cant, suggesting that respondents farther away from the New Towns are
less likely to exhibit preference for a stronger leader in politics.
The Regime promoted the ideological principles of nationalism and
(at least in the last part of the dictatorship) racism. Column 2 and 3 em-
ploy as outcomes the answer related to whether immigrants are a threat
to national culture or identity, and employment, respectively. Higher
values of the outcome indicate higher level of respondents’ agreement.
In line with the hypothesis, both columns display negative and signifi-
cant estimated coefficients. Taken together, the results of column 2 and
3 indicate that proximity to the Fascist New Towns is associated with
lower tolerance toward migrants.
4.3.1 Life under the Regime, Schooling, and the New Towns
The effect of the New Towns on political attitudes and beliefs should
be stronger for those cohorts who directly experienced life under Fas-
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Table 7: New Towns and Political Attitudes. Individual-Level Analysis.
(1) (2) (3)
Stronger Immigrants are a Threat to
VARIABLES Leader Identity/Culture Employment
Ln (Dist. to NT) -0.0357*** -0.0482** -0.0781***
[0.014] [0.020] [0.019]
Municipality Controls Yes Yes Yes
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes
Wave FE Yes Yes Yes
# of respondents 5484 5484 5484
# of municipalities 1513 1513 1513
Adjusted R-squared 0.0566 0.0771 0.0852
Notes: Observations are at the individual level. The surveys were
conducted in 2001 and 2008. The displayed coefficients are the av-
erage marginal effects from a OLS regression weighted using sur-
vey weights. Municipality controls include the log of population in
2001, distance to the closest capital of the province, a dummy for
the presence of malaria in 1870, and a measure of market access in
1921. Individual controls include age, years of education, gender, a
dummy for married, number of children, a dummy for employed,
and dummy variables for salaried, self employed, and atypical job.
Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in brack-
ets.
*** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** indicates significance
at the 5%-level, * indicates significance at the 10%-level.
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cism. For instance, the direct experience of the foundation of the New
Towns may have instilled in people’s mind a favorable memory of the
Fascist dictatorship, which persisted until the present day. Such an ef-
fect may also be due to indoctrination at school, which have may have
been stronger in the proximity of the New Towns. In the following, I ex-
plore these channels and their link with preferences for the fascists and
political opinions.
In table 8, I explore preferences for the fascists by using the same ap-
proach explored in table 6. In column (1), I report for comparison the
result from column (1) of table 6. In column (2), I interact the distance
to the closest New Town with the dummy “Lived under Fascism”, which
takes value one if the respondent was born before the end of the Fas-
cist Regime (1944). In line with the advanced hypothesis, the coefficient
of the interaction term is negative and significant, meaning that the link
between the New Towns and preferences for the fascists is larger in mag-
nitude for those who lived under the Fascist Dictatorship. Such an effect
may be driven by the direct effect of the New Towns, or by the fact that
the Fascist indoctrination at school was stronger in the proximity of the
New Towns.
In column (3), I investigate this possibility by interacting the distance
to the closest New Town with the dummy “School-Aged in Fascism”,
which takes value one if the respondent was of age between 6 and 13
(the compulsory schooling age at that time) during the Fascist Regime.
The estimated coefficient is negative but statistically insignificant.
Column (4) takes into account in the same regression both the inter-
action terms. Interestingly, the coefficient of the interaction term with
“Lived under Fascism” increases in magnitude and statistical signifi-
cance. In contrast, the coefficient of the interaction with “School-Aged
in Fascism” changes in sign and remains statistically indistinguishable
from zero. Such a result does not support that school indoctrination is
the main mechanism through which the New Towns influenced political
and cultural attitudes.16 In the following, I dig deeper into the analysis
16Albeit less precisely estimated, the findings are qualitatively similar if I employ as an
outcome the answer to the question “have you ever voted for the Neo-Fascist Party”.
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by using as outcomes direct measures of political attitudes.
Table 8: Life under Fascism, the New Towns, and Attitudes towards the Fas-
cists.
The Fascists should have the right to publicly manifest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln (Dist. to NT) -0.0395*** -0.0319** -0.0375*** -0.0323**
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013]
Ln (Dist. to NT) × Lived under Fascism -0.0491* -0.0743**
[0.027] [0.035]
Lived under Fascism 0.1027 0.1997
[0.108] [0.136]
Ln (Dist. to NT) × School-Aged in Fascism -0.0242 0.0447
[0.031] [0.041]
School-Aged in Fascism 0.0511 -0.1794
[0.123] [0.156]
Municipality Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Migration FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of respondents 1455 1455 1455 1455
# of municipalities 240 240 240 240
Pseudo R-squared 0.417 0.420 0.417 0.420
Notes: Observations are at the individual level. The coefficients displayed are the aver-
age marginal effects from a Probit regression weighted using sample weights. The vari-
able “Lived under Fascism” is a dummy taking value one if the respondent was born be-
fore the end of the Fascist Regime (= 1 for 307 respondents in the sample). The variable
School-Aged in Fascism is a dummy taking value one if the respondent was school-aged
(age ∈ [6,13]) during the Fascist Regime (= 1 for 166 respondents in the sample). All re-
gressions control for whether the respondent is in the same region in which his or her
father was at the age of 14. Municipality controls include the log of population in 2001,
distance to the closest capital of the province, a dummy for the presence of malaria in 1870,
a measure of market access in 1921. Migrant dummy takes on value one if the respondent
is in the same region in which his or her father at the age of 14. Individual controls in-
clude age, years of education, gender, a dummy for married, number of children, a dummy
for employed, and dummy variables for salaried, self employed, and atypical job. Addi-
tional individual controls include a set of dummies for the sector in which the respondent
is employed (agriculture, service, industry, public administration), a set of dummies for
the sector in which his or her father was employed when the respondent was 14 years old,
and a set of dummy for the sector in which the head of the household is employed. See
the main text and appendices for variables definitions and sources. Robust standard errors
clustered at the municipality level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level, * indi-
cates significance at the 10%-level.
In table 9, I investigate the role of the experience of life under the
dictatorship and the indoctrination at school on other political attitudes
that are in line with the Fascist views. In column (1), I use as an outcome
a variable which indicates preferences for a stronger leader in politics.
Interestingly, life under the dictatorship does not seem to matter, as ex-
The results are illustrated in appendix table A6, where the lack of precision of the
estimated coefficients may be due to the low propensity of respondents to reveal
their voting choices.
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plained by the statistical insignificance of both the interaction term and
the liner term of the variable “Lived under Fascism”. In contrast, the in-
teraction term of “School-Aged in Fascism” and the distance to the New
Towns is actually positive and significant. Which suggests that indoc-
trination at school was potentially different in the proximity of the New
Towns, but its effect on preferences for stronger leader was actually neg-
ative. A possible explanation could be that the presence of authoritarian
teachers in the fascist schools may have counteracted the indoctrination
of the strong leader principle.
In columns (2) and (3), I explore the interaction of the New Towns
with the indoctrination-at-school effect, and the life-under-fascism ef-
fect, on the lack of tolerance towards immigrants. Interestingly, in this
context, while the effect of life under fascism is not significant, the role
of school indoctrination is negative and significant. Suggesting that the
effect of indoctrination at school reduced tolerance towards immigrants
(in general) and that such an effect was particularly effective in the areas
of the Fascist New Towns. This finding may indicate that the racial laws
implemented by the Regime, by influencing the composition of teachers,
classmates, and the programs taught, had persistent effects on tolerance
towards immigrants.
5 Concluding Remarks
This research shows that local public spending may have long-lasting
effects on electoral outcomes which persists across major institutional
changes and over several decades. Furthermore, it shows that the lo-
cal effect of public spending on political attitudes may be an important
mechanism to explain such persistence.
The findings that public spending may have long-lasting effects on
cultural and political attitudes, in turn influencing the functioning of
institutions in the future, has important implications for our under-
standing of the channels through which the coevolution of institutions
and culture unfolds. Furthermore, it may inspire future research on the
35
Table 9: Life under Fascism, the New Towns, and Political Attitudes.
(1) (2) (3)
Stronger Immigrants are a Threat to
VARIABLES Leader Identity/Culture Employment
Ln (Dist. to NT) -0.0482*** -0.0576** -0.0762***
[0.017] [0.025] [0.024]
Ln (Dist. to NT) × Lived under Fascism -0.0630 0.0246 0.0557
[0.043] [0.049] [0.051]
Lived under Fascism 0.2493 -0.1356 -0.2303
[0.166] [0.195] [0.201]
Ln (Dist. to NT) × School-Aged in Fascism 0.1121** -0.0906* -0.0922*
[0.052] [0.054] [0.055]
School-Aged in Fascism -0.2967 0.5120** 0.5117**
[0.197] [0.210] [0.223]
Municipality Controls Yes Yes Yes
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
# of respondents 5484 5484 5484
# of municipalities 1513 1513 1513
Adjusted R-squared 0.0577 0.0807 0.0873
Notes: Observations are at the individual level. The surveys were conducted in 2001 and
2008. The displayed coefficients are the average marginal effects from a OLS regression
weighted using survey weights. The variable “Lived under Fascism” is a dummy taking
value one if the respondent was born before the end of the Fascist Regime (= 1 for 1445 re-
spondents in the sample). The variable School-Aged in Fascism is a dummy taking value
one if the respondent was school-aged (age ∈ [6,13]) during the Fascist Regime (= 1 for
850 respondents in the sample). Municipality controls include the log of population in
2001, distance to the closest capital of the province, a dummy for the presence of malaria
in 1870, and a measure of market access in 1921. Individual controls include age, years
of education, gender, a dummy for married, number of children, a dummy for employed,
and dummy variables for salaried, self employed, and atypical job. Robust standard er-
rors clustered at the municipality level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level, * indi-
cates significance at the 10%-level.
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study of whether policy interventions may be effective in promoting the
adoption of growth-enhancing cultural traits.
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Appendices
A Additional Results
A.1 Channels of Persistence
In this section I further investigate the mechanism of persistence
through which the New Towns may have influenced political choices
over the long term.
The foundation of the New Towns and the new markets associated
with it may have been perceived by citizens as growth enhancing, ul-
timately influencing their political views in favor of the fascists. Such
an effect on perception would have been relevant independently on
whether the New Towns were actually growth enhancing or not. There-
fore, if this mechanism was a relevant one, the long-term effect of the
distance to the New Towns on political choices should be magnified in
municipalities that experienced an increase in market access over the
fascist period.
I measure the improvement in living standards due to the creation
of new markets by using the growth in market access over the period
from 1921 to 1936. In particular, I employ the standard measure of
market access by Harris (1954a), which is defined by the sum of the
population in all neighbor municipalities weighted by distance.17 Then
I investigate its interaction with the distance to the New Towns. The
results are shown in table A1.
As shown in the first column of table A1, the interaction term of
growth in market access over the fascist period and the distance to the
New Towns is negative and significant. Suggesting that the growth in
market access in the proximity of the New Towns instilled in citizens
the idea that the fascist policy was indeed effective. I will further inves-
17 For each municipality i, market access is given by
P
j,i
Popj
di,j
, where Popj is the popu-
lation in municipality j and di,j is the distance between municipality i and j
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tigate this mechanism in the following.
The redistribution of the newly reclaimed land may have affected cit-
izens in the New Towns through a direct wealth effect and, in turn, indi-
rectly affected neighbor municipalities through, for instance, an increase
in the demand for locally traded goods and services, or an increase in the
supply of local amenities. These effects would be stronger in places were
the distribution of land ownership was more unequal.
I investigate this mechanism by employing data from the Census of
Agriculture in 1929 and calculate the Gini coefficient of farm size in
1931 as a proxy for inequality of land ownership. In column 2, I inter-
act this measure of land inequality with the distance to the closest New
Town. I find that the interaction term of this measure of land inequality
and the distance to the New Towns to be statistically insignificant. This
result does not seem to support the hypothesis of land redistribution as
the main channel.
I dig deeper into this mechanism and investigate whether a larger
share of colonists (the contract given to farmers in the newly reclaimed
land) interacts with the New Towns. The interaction term is insignificant
both using share of colonist families and the share of colonist population
(columns 3 and 4, respectively). These results do not support the land
redistribution channel as the main mechanism at work.
Literacy may have affected the exposure of citizens to the Fascist pro-
paganda in the newspapers and posters. If the propaganda associated
with the New Towns was the main channel, we may observe the coeffi-
cient of interest to be enlarged (in absolute value) by the interaction with
literacy. In column 5, I find limited evidence of a significant interaction
between literacy in 1921 and the distance to the closest New Town.
Furthermore, I find limited evidence of a significant interaction of the
New Towns with the preexisting malaria (column 6), with the Battle for
Grain (column 7), and with suitability for agriculture (column 8).
The results so far point to the effect of the New Towns on the “de-
mand” for Fascism coming from individuals who updated their beliefs
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towards a more favorable view of Fascism. Yet, the estimated effect
may come from the “supply” of Fascism, as caused by the strength of
the Fascist institutions, which might be greater in the areas of the New
Towns. If this is the case, the strength of the Fascist institutions should
be greater in the provinces that were created by the Fascists in 1927 as
they were created and governed by individuals appointed by the Fascist
Regime. I investigate this issue in column 9. In particular, the interac-
tion between the distance to the closest New Town and a dummy that
takes value one if the municipality falls within one of the new provinces
created by the Fascist Regime in 1927 is statistically indistinguishable
from zero. Suggesting that the effect of the New Towns unfolded pre-
dominantly through the individuals’ tendency to support the Fascists,
rather than by the direct effect of stronger Fascist institutions in those
places. Interestingly, the fascist provinces still display larger support
for the Neo-Fascist Party, a finding in line with the persistent influence
of local institutions. Yet, such an effect does not seem to be relevant for
the study of the New Towns.
A.2 New Towns, NewMarkets
The finding of a significant interaction between the Fascist New
Towns and the change in market access over the period of the policy
provides evidence that the perception that the policy improved living
standards may have played a role in influencing their attitudes in favor
of the fascist views. If this was the case, growth in market access should
interact with the New Towns only over the fascist period, but not before.
I investigate this hypothesis in table A2.
As a falsification test, in columns from 1 to 4 I investigate whether
the interaction between growth in market access in previous years and
the distance to the New Towns can explain differences in the support
for the Neo-Fascist Party in 1992. As evident from the table, the in-
teraction term is statistically indistinguishable from zero in any census
year before the policy. In line with the hypothesis, the interaction term
becomes statistically significant precisely over the fascist period. Such
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Table A1: The Long Run Shadow of the New Towns: Channels of Persistence
Dependent Variables: Share of Votes for the Neo Fascist Party in 1992
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Ln (Dist. to NT) -0.1967*** -0.1858*** -0.2907*** -0.2912*** -0.1464** -0.1872*** -0.1938*** -0.2023*** -0.1776***
[0.058] [0.055] [0.072] [0.072] [0.056] [0.067] [0.054] [0.056] [0.051]
Ln (Dist. to NT) × Gwth Mkt Access 1921-1936 -0.0701**
[0.034]
Gwth Mkt Access 1921-1936 0.0597
[0.055]
Ln (Dist. to NT) × Land Inequality 1931 -0.0144
[0.021]
Land Inequality 1931 0.0185
[0.030]
Ln (Dist. to NT) × Share Colonist Population 1931 0.0199
[0.033]
Share Colonist Population 1931 0.0112
[0.040]
Ln (Dist. to NT) × Share Colonist Families 1931 0.0225
[0.033]
Share Colonist Population 1931 0.0141
[0.038]
Ln (Dist. to NT) × Literacy 1921 -0.0337
[0.044]
Literacy 1921 -0.1566***
[0.045]
Ln (Dist. to NT) ×Malaria 1881 0.0093
[0.070]
Malaria 1881 0.1471*
[0.080]
Ln (Dist. to NT) ×Wheat Suitability -0.0526
[0.046]
Wheat Suitability 0.0486
[0.049]
Ln (Dist. to NT) × Suitability for Agriculture -0.0529
[0.044]
Suitability for Agriculture 0.1187**
[0.046]
Ln (Dist. to NT) × New Fascist Province 1927 -0.0284
[0.189]
New Fascist Province 1926 0.3265*
[0.194]
Observations 7,761 6,635 4,004 4,005 7,291 7,761 7,758 7,761 7,761
Adjusted R-squared 0.110 0.093 0.117 0.117 0.111 0.097 0.099 0.109 0.110
Notes: Observations are at the municipality-level. Standardized coefficients are reported. All regressions include as controls the log of market access in
1921, the log of population in 1991, and malaria prevalence in 1881. See main text and appendices for variables definitions and sources. Robust standard
errors clustered at the province level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level, * indicates significance at the 10%-level. Differences in the sample size
are due to data availability.
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Table A2: The New Towns and Market Access
Dependent Variable: Share of Votes for Neo Fascist Party in 1992
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ln (Dist. to NT) -0.2072*** -0.1958*** -0.2200*** -0.1798*** -0.2091*** -0.2445*** -0.3203***
[0.054] [0.055] [0.051] [0.055] [0.052] [0.056] [0.075]
Gwth Mkt Access 1861-1871 -0.1373***
[0.042]
Ln (Dist. to NT) × Gwth Mkt Access 1861-1871 0.0057
[0.040]
Gwth Mkt Access 1871-1881 -0.1148**
[0.047]
Ln (Dist. to NT) × Gwth Mkt Access 1871-1881 0.0554
[0.042]
Gwth Mkt Access 1871-1881 0.1547***
[0.054]
Ln (Dist. to NT) × Gwth Mkt Access 1881-1901 -0.0099
[0.044]
Gwth Mkt Access 1901-1911 -0.1459***
[0.046]
Ln (Dist. to NT) × Gwth Mkt Access 1901-1911 -0.0527
[0.048]
Gwth Mkt Access 1911-1921 -0.1849***
[0.047]
Ln (Dist. to NT) × Gwth Mkt Access 1911-1921 -0.0006
[0.029]
Gwth Mkt Access 1921-1936 0.0205 0.0932
[0.053] [0.071]
Ln (Dist. to NT) × Gwth Mkt Access 1921-1936 -0.0814** -0.1318**
[0.033] [0.055]
Dist.to NT ≥ 20 km Yes
Observations 7,760 7,760 7,760 7,760 7,760 7,760 6,745
Adjusted R-squared 0.108 0.107 0.116 0.114 0.117 0.106 0.091
Notes: Observations are at the municipality-level. Standardized coefficients are reported. All regressions include as controls
the log of market access in 1861, the log of population in 1991, and malaria prevalence in 1881. The last column excludes
municipalities within 20 kilometers from the closest New Town. See main text and appendices for variables definitions and
sources. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level, * indicates significance at the 10%-level.
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Figure 7: The New Towns and Growth in Market Access Over Time
Notes: This figure shows the estimated coefficient from a set of regressions of the share of votes for the Neo-
Fascist Party in 1992 on the interaction between distance to the closest New Town and the growth in market
access in each year. The interaction term is negative and significant only in the fascist period but not before.
finding strongly support the channel that the perception of improved
living standards favored the fascist political views over the long term.
The interaction coefficients are depicted in figure 7.
Finally, the last column investigate the robustness of the finding to
the exclusion of municipalities within 20 kilometers to the closest New
Town. Reassuringly the estimated coefficient remains statistically signif-
icant. The coefficient of the interaction terms in columns 5 and 6 suggest
that a one-standards deviation reduction in market access growth over
the relevant years may reduce the relevance of the New Towns in ex-
plaining differences in the support for the Neo Fascist Party in 1992 by
up to 40%. These findings support the hypothesis that citizens’ percep-
tion of growth is an important mechanism though which political views
may persistently change.
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A.3 The Magnitude of the Investment in the New Towns
The estimated effect of the New Town May have been larger in places
were the investment in infrastructure was larger. Due to data limitation,
I employ as a proxy for the size of the investment the number of years
of construction of the closest New Town, conditioning on its population.
In line with the hypothesis, the effect of the distance to the New Town
is larger in places where the closest New Town was built over a longer
period of time. The results are shown in table A3.
Table A3: The Size of the New Towns
Dependent Variables: Share of Votes for the Neo-Fascist Party 1992
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Ln (Dist. to NT) -0.1262** -0.1249** -0.1262** -0.1209** -0.0995*
[0.052] [0.052] [0.052] [0.053] [0.053]
Ln(Dist to NT) × Ln(Years of Construction) -0.1570** -0.1557* -0.1570** -0.1653** -0.2823**
[0.079] [0.079] [0.079] [0.081] [0.107]
Ln(Years of Construction) 0.0858 0.0858 0.0858 0.0834 0.1832*
[0.068] [0.069] [0.068] [0.068] [0.105]
Population Closest NT 1936 -0.0066
[0.035]
Population Closest NT 1951 0.0215 0.0291
[0.035] [0.036]
Observations 6,790 6,760 6,790 6,760 6,506
Adjusted R-squared 0.130 0.130 0.130 0.130 0.143
Notes: Observations are at the municipality-level. Standardized coefficients are reported. All
regressions include as controls the log of market access in 1861, the log of population in 1991,
and malaria prevalence in 1881. The last column excludes municipalities within 20 kilometers
from the closest New Town. See main text and appendices for variables definitions and sources.
Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level, * indicates
significance at the 10%-level.
A.4 Intimidation and the 1924 Electoral Outcome
It is possible that violence and intimidation were employed by the
fascists to enhance the support of the Fascist Party in the 1924 elections.
In case of perfect intimidation, the support for the Fascist Party in those
elections would be 100% in all municipalities. In contrast, there is sig-
nificant variation in the electoral support for the Party in 1924. For ex-
ample, about 10% of the municipalities exhibited less than 20% of the
votes for the Party. Suggesting that intimidation was far from perfect.
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However, if investment in intimidation was complementing invest-
ments in the local public spending for the New Towns to boost popular
support, then using 1924 electoral outcomes as a dependent variable
may rise concerns on intimidation as a potentially omitted factor. In
contrast, if intimidation was used as a substitute of the New Towns, then
the estimated coefficient would be a lower bound of the true parameter
of interest. Finally, it is possible that intimidation increased the average
support for the country as a whole, in turn setting aside the role of in-
timidation as an omitted factor. The latter hypothesis would be corrobo-
rated if the support for the Fascists in 1924 were significantly correlated
with the support for the Neo-Fascist Party in the post-war period, when
no intimidation took place. In contrast, if intimidation were the main
driver of the electoral support in 1924, then there should be no corre-
lation between the electoral support for the Fascists in 1924 and for the
Neo-Fascists in the postwar period.
In the first elections in which the Neo-Fascist Party was allowed
to participate (1948), social pressure against the ideology of the Fas-
cist Regime discouraged people from voting for the Neo-Fascist Party.18
Thus, I look at the relationship between the electoral support for the
Fascist Party in 1924 and for the Neo-Fascist Party in 1953, when no
intimidation occurred. Figure 8 shows a binned scatter plot of the elec-
toral support for the Fascist Party in 1924 against the support for the
Neo-fascist Party in 1953. The striking positive association displayed in
the figure supports the hypothesis that intimidation was mainly enhanc-
ing the average support for the Fascist Party in the country as a whole,
rather than being used as a complement of local public spending to en-
hance local political support.
A similar approach can be used by investigating the relationship be-
tween the electoral support for the Fascists in the 1921 elections and that
in 1924. Figure 9 shows the link between the electoral support for the
Fascists in 1924 and 1921. The left panel shows a positive but moder-
ate association between the two variables. However, it becomes becomes
18 In 1948, the Neo-Fascist Party receiver 2.1 % of the votes at the national level. In the
1953 and 1958 elections, it received 5.84 % and 4.76%, respectively.
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Figure 8: Persistence in the Support for Fascism
Notes: The figures show the striking correlation between the support for Neo-Fascism and for Fascism. The
left panel shows binned scatter plots (30 equally-sized bins) of the share of votes for the Neo-Fascist Party
in 1953 and for the Fascist Party in 1924. The right panel shows the same graph excluding municipalities
that exhibited no votes for the Fascist Party in 1924 and thus were presumably unaffected by the Fascist
intimidation.
highly positive when I exclude municipalities that did not vote for the
Fascists in 1921. In other words, on the intensive margin, there is strong
persistence in voting patterns. Yet, in municipalities that did not sup-
port the Fascists in 1921 were presumably more likely to be targeted by
intimidation in 1924 or by the New Towns construction.
To shed light on this issue, figure 10 shows the link between the share
of votes for the Neo-Fascist Party in 1953 and that for the Fascist Party
in 1924 only for the municipalities that exhibited no votes for the Fas-
cists in 1921. Interestingly, even within this group, there is persistence
in the support for the Fascist views as indicated by electoral outcomes,
ultimately suggesting that their support in 1924 was not predominantly
driven by intimidation.
A.5 Migration, Population Growth, and the New Towns
The New Towns were predominantly built in areas uninhabited due
to the presence of malarial swamps (see figure 1), which were populated
with citizens from other regions (mainly Veneto). The magnitude of this
increment in population is debated (Treves, 1980). Using data from pop-
ulation censuses, I empirically investigate its statistical significance.
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Figure 9: Persistence in the Support for Fascism
Notes: The figures show binned scatter plots (30 equally-sized bins) of the electoral support for Fascist Party
in 1924 versus the one in 1921. While the left panel employs all the available data, the right panel excludes
municipalities that exhibited no votes for the Fascist Party in 1921.
Figure 10: Persistence in the Support for Fascism
Notes: The figure shows the striking positive correlation between the support for Neo-Fascism in 1953 and
for Fascism in 1924 across the municipalities that exhibited no votes for the Fascists in 1921 and thus were
presumably more likely to be exposed to the Fascist intimidation in the 1924 elections.
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Table A4 shows the estimates from regressing population growth over
the period of the Fascist Regime on the distance to the New Towns. Col-
umn 1 employs as an outcome the growth in population between 1921
and 1936.19 The coefficient is negative, meaning that the municipali-
ties in the vicinity of the Fascist New Towns experienced an increase in
population that is higher than those further away. This result is in line
with the historical literature on the migration to the New Towns. In col-
umn 2, I restrict the sample excluding municipalities that are within 20
kilometers from the closest New Town. Using this approach, I exclude
municipalities that were directly affected by the in-migration due to the
foundation of the New Towns. Within the restricted sample, differences
in population growth are not statistically significant from zero.
Given that the Mussolini ruled until 1943, I perform the same exer-
cise using as an outcome growth in population from 1921 until 1951.20
Column 3 shows that. even considering a longer period of time, popu-
lation growth is significantly larger in places near the New Towns. Col-
umn 4 performs the same sample restriction of column 2. Again, in this
restricted sample, population growth is not statistically different from
zero.
The results shown in this section suggest that the exclusion of munic-
ipalities within 20 kilometers from the closest New Town should mini-
mize concerns on the potentially confounding effect of migration to the
New Towns.
A.6 New Towns and the Persistence of Neo-Fascism:
Individual-Level Analysis
The survey ITANES 2001 provides questions on whether the respon-
dent has ever voted for the Neo-Fascist Party.21 In addition, the survey
19 The Fascist Party was in power from 1922 to 1943.
20 The population census was not conducted between 1936 and 1951.
21 In 2001, the Neo-Fascist Party did not exist anymore, thus the analysis is restricted
to respondents that were in their voting age in 1992— the last year in which the
Neo-Fascist Party took part to the elections.
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Table A4: Limited Importance of the New Towns for Population Growth
Dependent Variables: Population Growth over the years:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1921-36 1921-36 1921-51 1921-51
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS
Ln (Dist. to NT) -0.0194* -0.0093 -0.0453** -0.0294
[0.011] [0.018] [0.017] [0.029]
Observations 6,459 5,598 7,256 6,319
Adjusted R-squared 0.011 0.005 0.059 0.034
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dist.to NT ≥ 20 km No Yes No Yes
Notes: Observations are at the municipality-level. Standardized
coefficients are reported. Baseline controls include an indicator
variable for the presence of malaria in 1870, a measure of market
access based on population in 1921, and distance to the closest
provincial capital. See the main text and appendices for variables
definitions and sources. Robust standard errors clustered at the
province level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** indicates significance
at the 5%-level, * indicates significance at the 10%-level.
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provides information on whether the respondent’s mother or father ever
voted for the Party. The results are illustrated in table A5.
Column 1 displays the estimates from regressing a binary outcome
variable outcome variable that takes value one if the respondent has
ever voted for the Neo Fascist Party on the distance of the municipality
to the closest Fascist New Town. The column controls for the baseline
municipality-level controls: the presence of malaria 1870, distance to
the closest provincial capital, and the standard measure of market ac-
cess based on population in 1921, thus before the construction of the
New Towns.
Column 2 controls for a dummy that takes value one if the individual
is in the same region in which his or her father was when he was fourteen
years old. If the estimated coefficient was entirely driven by migration
towards (or from areas near) the New Towns, then the introduction of
this control should severely affect the estimates.22 As evident from the
comparison between column 1 and column 2, the estimated coefficient
increases in magnitude (in absolute value), minimizing the concern of
the relevance of migration as a confounding factor.
Average individual characteristics may differ in areas in the proxim-
ity of the New Towns and have an independent effect on the propensity
of an individual to support the Neo-Fascist ideology. To take into ac-
count these potentially confounding factors, column 3 introduces a set
of individual controls. In particular, it takes into account age, years of
education, gender, an indicator variable for whether the respondent is
married or not, number of children, an indicator variable for whether
the respondent is employed, and a set of indicator variable that take into
account whether the respondent has a salaried job, is self employed, or
has and atypical job. The introduction of these individual controls fur-
ther improves the estimated coefficient, suggesting that both individual
characteristics. if anything, can bias the coefficient towards zero.
The sector in which the respondent is employed may affect the
22Migration towards the New Towns was mainly inter-regional (Treves, 1980). Fur-
thermore, note that the variable takes also into account the potentially confounding
effect of migration after the construction of the New Towns.
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Table A5: New Towns and the Persistence of Neo Fascism. Individual-Level Analysis.
Dependent Variable: Ever voted for the Neo Fascist Party (2001)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Pr(Yes)
VARIABLES Mother Father
Ln (Dist. to NT) -0.0208* -0.0242** -0.0258** -0.0271** -0.0211* -0.0122* -0.0148*
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.006] [0.008]
Municipality Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Migration Dummy No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Individual Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Non Migrant Only No No No No Yes Yes Yes
# of respondents 2729 2729 2729 2729 2221 1440 1535
# of municipalities 250 250 250 250 249 241 242
Pseudo R-squared 0.0163 0.0204 0.0381 0.0462 0.0430 0.0962 0.0542
Notes: Observations are at the individual level. The displayed coefficients are the average marginal
effects from a Probit regression weighted using survey weights. Municipality controls include the
log of population in 2001, distance to the closest capital of the province, a dummy for the presence
of malaria in 1870, a measure of market access in 1921. Migrant dummy takes on value one if the
respondent is in the same region in which his or her father was at the age of 14. Individual controls
include age, years of education, gender, a dummy for married, number of children, a dummy for em-
ployed, and dummy variables for salaried, self employed, and atypical job. Additional individual
controls include a set of dummies for the sector in which the respondent is employed (agriculture,
service, industry, public administration), a set of dummies for the sector in which his or her father
was employed when the respondent was 14 years old, and a set of dummy for the sector in which
the head of the household is employed. The Neo Fascist Party took part to the elections for the last
time in 1992, so the sample is restricted to those who had the right to vote in 1992. Robust standard
errors clustered at the municipality level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level, * indicates signif-
icance at the 10%-level.
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Table A6: New Towns and the Persistence of Neo Fascism. Individual-Level
Analysis.
Dependent Variable: Ever voted for the Neo Fascist Party
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pr(Yes) Pr(Yes) Pr(Yes) Pr(Yes)
Ln (Dist. to NT) -0.0269** -0.0217* -0.0230** -0.0215*
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011]
Ln (Dist. to NT) × Lived under Fascism -0.0181 -0.0138
[0.013] [0.022]
Lived under Fascism 0.0685 0.0450
[0.055] [0.085]
Ln (Dist. to NT) × School-Aged in Fascism -0.0174 -0.0053
[0.014] [0.024]
School-Aged in Fascism 0.0889* 0.0464
[0.053] [0.087]
Municipality Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Migration FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of respondents 2730 2730 2730 2730
# of municipalities 250 250 250 250
Pseudo R-squared 0.0461 0.0468 0.0471 0.0473
Notes: Observations are at the individual level. The displayed coefficients are the av-
erage marginal effects from a Probit regression weighted using survey weights. The
variable “Lived under Fascism” is a dummy taking value one if the respondent was
born before the end of the Fascist Regime (= 1 for 951 respondents in the sample).
The variable School-Aged in Fascism is a dummy taking value one if the respondent
was school-aged (age ∈ [6,13]) during the Fascist Regime (= 1 for 613 respondents in
the sample). Municipality controls include the log of population in 2001, distance to
the closest capital of the province, a dummy for the presence of malaria in 1870, a
measure of market access in 1921. Migrant dummy takes on value one if the respon-
dent is in the same region in which his or her father was at the age of 14. Individual
controls include age, years of education, gender, a dummy for married, number of
children, a dummy for employed, and dummy variables for salaried, self employed,
and atypical job. Additional individual controls include a set of dummies for the
sector in which the respondent is employed (agriculture, service, industry, public ad-
ministration), a set of dummies for the sector in which his or her father was employed
when the respondent was 14 years old, and a set of dummy for the sector in which the
head of the household is employed. The Neo Fascist Party took part to the elections
for the last time in 1992, so the sample is restricted to those who had the right to vote
in 1992. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level, *
indicates significance at the 10%-level.
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propensity to support the Neo Fascist ideology independently of the
presence of the New Towns. Similarly, the sector in which his or her
parents worked may determine cultural aspects that may influence the
propensity of the respondent to support the Neo-Fascist Party. Column
4 controls for a set of indicator variables that take into account the sec-
tor in which the respondent is employed (agriculture, manufacturing,
services, and public administration), the sector in which the head of
the household is employed, and the sector in which the respondent’s fa-
ther was employed when he was fourteen years old.23 These additional
controls further strengthen the estimated link between the Fascist New
Towns and the propensity of the respondent to vote for the Neo Fascist
Party.
Column 5 further minimizes concerns on the effect of migration. In
particular, it restricts the sample to individuals who are in the same re-
gion in which his or her father was when they were fourteen years old.
Reassuringly, the estimated coefficient holds despite the reduction in the
number of observations.
Column 6 employs as an outcome an indicator variable that takes
value one if the respondent’s mother has ever voted for the Neo Fascist
party. Similarly, column 7 employs as an outcome an indicator vari-
able that takes value one if the respondent’s father has ever voted for
the Neo Fascist Party. Interestingly, both coefficients are of the hypoth-
esized sign, which is in line with the hypothesis that proximity to the
Fascist New Towns influenced political attitudes of the parents which
have been transmitted to their children.
The results are qualitatively similar, yet less precisely estimated,
when the sample is restricted only to individuals who were born dur-
ing the Fascist Dictatorship. Such a reduction in precision may be due
to the reduction in the sample size, together with the limited propensity
of respondents to declare whether they have voted for the Neo-Fascist
Party, which was characterized by an extreme position on the political
and ideological spectrum. The estimates are illustrated in table A7.
23 These control variables are only available in the waves of 2001 and 2004.
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Table A7: New Towns and the Persistence of Neo Fascism. Respondents Born during the Fascist Era.
Dependent Variable: Ever voted for the Neo Fascist Party (2001)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Pr(Yes)
VARIABLES Mother Father
Ln (Dist. to NT) -0.0198 -0.0228 -0.0285* -0.0274* -0.0239 -0.0164* -0.0134
[0.017] [0.017] [0.016] [0.015] [0.016] [0.009] [0.012]
Municipality Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Migration FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Individual Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Non Migrant Only No No No No Yes Yes Yes
# of respondents 991 991 991 988 777 522 543
# of municipalities 231 231 231 230 222 188 190
Pseudo R-squared 0.0351 0.0375 0.0621 0.0847 0.0690 0.171 0.153
Notes: Observations are at the individual level. The sample is restricted to respondents born
before 1944. The displayed coefficients are the average marginal effects from a Probit regres-
sion weighted using survey weights. Municipality controls include the log of population in
2001, distance to the closest capital of the province, a dummy for the presence of malaria in
1870, a measure of market access in 1921. Migrant dummy takes on value one if the respon-
dent is in the same region in which his or her father was at the age of 14. Individual controls
include age, years of education, gender, a dummy for married, number of children, a dummy
for employed, and dummy variables for salaried, self employed, and atypical job. Additional
individual controls include a set of dummies for the sector in which the respondent is em-
ployed (agriculture, service, industry, public administration), a set of dummies for the sector
in which his or her father was employed when the respondent was 14 years old, and a set of
dummy for the sector in which the head of the household is employed. The Neo Fascist Party
took part to the elections for the last time in 1992, so the sample is restricted to those who
had the right to vote in 1992. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in
brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level, * indicates
significance at the 10%-level.
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Table B8: The Timing of the New Towns and Electoral Outcomes
Dependent Variables: Share of Votes for the Fascist Party:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1921 1924
Placebo Placebo Placebo
Ln (Dist to NT) 0.2784*** -0.2402*** -0.2219***
[0.093] [0.077] [0.073]
Ln (Dist. to NT until 1924) -0.2858*** -0.2375*** -0.1504*
[0.078] [0.080] [0.083]
Ln (Dist. to NT after 1924) -0.1122 0.0232
[0.082] [0.080]
Ln (Dist to NT Unknown Year) -0.3467***
[0.101]
Ln (Dist to Placebo NT) -0.1199 -0.0722
[0.080] [0.068]
Observations 2,057 2,057 2,057 2,057 2,057 2,057 2,057
Adjusted R-squared 0.070 0.059 0.099 0.108 0.155 0.017 0.064
Notes: Observations are at themunicipality-level. Standardized coefficients are reported. See themain text and appendices
for variables definitions and sources. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level, * indicates significance at the 10%-level.
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Table B9: Robustness to Controlling for the Suitability for Malaria: Short-term Effect
Dependent Variable: Share of Votes for the Fascist Party in 1924
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FP ’24 FP ’24 FP ’24 FP ’24 FP ’24 FP ’24
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Ln (Dist. to NT until 1924) -0.2858*** -0.3159*** -0.2676*** -0.2059* -0.2365** -0.2342**
[0.078] [0.075] [0.090] [0.111] [0.108] [0.107]
FP ’21 0.1773*** 0.1731*** 0.1804*** 0.1730*** 0.1723***
[0.061] [0.058] [0.058] [0.056] [0.055]
Observations 2,057 2,057 2,057 2,057 2,057 2,057
Adjusted R-squared 0.099 0.132 0.151 0.162 0.175 0.175
Malaria Suitability No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market Access Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls No No No No Yes Yes
Agricultural Controls No No No No Yes Yes
Ln Population 1921 No No No No No Yes
Notes: Observations are at the municipality-level. Standardized coefficients are reported. See the main
text and appendices for variables definitions and sources. Robust standard errors clustered at the province
level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level, * indicates significance
at the 10%-level.
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Table B10: Robustness to Controlling for the Suitability for Malaria: Long-
term Effect
Dependent Variable: Share of Votes for Neo Fascist Party in 1992
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Neo FP ’92 Neo FP ’92 Neo FP ’92 Neo FP ’92 Neo FP ’92 Neo FP ’92
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Ln (Dist. to NT) -0.2663*** -0.1791*** -0.1847*** -0.1894*** -0.1665***
[0.050] [0.058] [0.053] [0.053] [0.056]
Ln (Dist to Placebo NT) 0.1430**
[0.066]
Observations 7,438 7,438 7,438 7,438 7,438 7,438
Adjusted R-squared 0.067 0.098 0.119 0.122 0.129 0.130
Malaria Suitability No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market Access Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Agricultural Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population Controls No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: Observations are at the municipality-level. Standardized coefficients are reported. See the
main text and appendices for variables definitions and sources. Robust standard errors clustered
at the province level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level, * indicates sig-
nificance at the 10%-level.
Table B11: New Towns and Rascism
Dependent Variable: Should Have the Right to Publicly Manifest (2004)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Against the Against the Divide
VARIABLES Communists Muslims Homosexuals Racists President Pope North from South
Ln (Dist. to NT) 0.0074 -0.0022 0.0151 -0.0288** 0.0101 -0.0168 0.0575***
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.014] [0.011] [0.012] [0.016]
Municipality Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Migration FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of respondents 1455 1455 1455 1455 1455 1455 1455
# of municipalities 240 240 240 240 240 240 240
Pseudo R-squared 0.384 0.388 0.410 0.310 0.449 0.471 0.284
Notes: Observations are at the individual level. The displayed coefficients are the average marginal effects from a Probit
regression weighted using survey weights. All regressions control for whether the respondent is in the same region in which
his or her father was at the age of 14. Municipality controls include the log of population in 2001, distance to the closest
capital of the province, a dummy for the presence of malaria in 1870, a measure of market access in 1921. Migrant dummy
takes on value one if the respondent is in the same region in which his or her father at the age of 14. Individual controls
include age, years of education, gender, a dummy for married, number of children, a dummy for employed, and dummy
variables for salaried, self employed, and atypical job. Additional individual controls include a set of dummies for the sector
in which the respondent is employed (agriculture, service, industry, public administration), a set of dummies for the sector in
which his or her father was employed when the respondent was 14 years old, and a set of dummy for the sector in which the
head of the household is employed. See the main text and appendices for variables definitions and sources. Robust standard
errors clustered at the municipality level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level, * indicates significance at the 10%-level.
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Table B12: The Timing of the Treatment: Placebos
Dependent Variables: Share of Votes for the (Neo) Fascist Party in the year:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Placebo Placebo
1921 1924 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1972 1976 1979 1983 1987 1992
D
30km
(1923−24) -0.5453** 0.6573*** -0.0419 -0.3086 -0.0192 0.2216 0.0904 0.4647 0.4324 0.4362 0.1691 -0.3119 0.0852
[0.249] [0.167] [0.088] [0.244] [0.449] [0.428] [0.404] [0.329] [0.312] [0.354] [0.307] [0.327] [0.583]
Observations 2,264 2,264 2,125 2,120 2,127 2,124 2,257 2,259 2,262 2,257 2,261 2,259 2,263
Adjusted R-2 0.026 0.033 0.003 0.039 0.022 0.027 0.021 0.061 0.053 0.034 0.014 0.010 0.012
Notes: Observations are at the municipality-level. Standardized coefficients are reported. See main text and appendices for
variables definitions and sources. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level, * indicates significance at the 10%-level.
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Table B13: The Timing of the Treatment: Wider Radius
Dependent Variables: Share of Votes for the Fascist Party 1924
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
D
15km
(1923−24)
0.3244
[0.340]
D
20km
(1923−24)
0.4885*
[0.282]
D
25km
(1923−24)
0.5518***
[0.178]
D
30km
(1923−24)
0.6573***
[0.167]
D
35km
(1923−24)
0.6804***
[0.244]
D
40km
(1923−24)
0.5679**
[0.223]
D
45km
(1923−24)
0.3804*
[0.200]
D
50km
(1923−24)
0.3975*
[0.219]
D
55km
(1923−24)
0.2754
[0.198]
D
60km
(1923−24)
0.1386
[0.161]
Observations 2,264 2,264 2,264 2,264 2,264 2,264 2,264 2,264 2,264 2,264
Number of Treated Obs. 19 39 63 82 102 113 140 162 184 197
Adjusted R-squared 0.009 0.013 0.023 0.033 0.041 0.048 0.055 0.057 0.054 0.053
Notes: Observations are at the municipality-level. Each regression includes a dummy that takes value one if a New
Town was initiated within the relevant radius between 1923 and 1926, and a dummy that takes value one if it the New
Towns was initiated in within the relevant radius in any other year. Standardized coefficients are reported. See main
text and appendices for variables definitions and sources. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in
brackets. Estimated t-statistics are depicted in figure 11
*** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level, * indicates significance at the 10%-
level.
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C Ancillary Figures
Figure 11: The Choice of the 30-Kilometers Cutoff
Notes: The figure depicts the estimated t-statistics from estimating equation 1 with different cutoffs. The
figure shows that the t-statistic is maximized when the model is estimated with a 30-kilometers cutoff. Esti-
mates are given by the coefficient of interest and standard errors reported in table B13.
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Figure 12: The Timing of the Treatment: Robustness
(a) Placebo: Share of Votes for the Neo-Fascist Party in 1953
(b) Placebo: Share of Votes for the Neo-Fascist Party in 1992
Notes: Each figure shows the estimated coefficients from a regression of the share of votes for the Neo-Fascist
Party in 1953 (top panel) and in 1993 on indicator variables that take value one if the construction of a New
Town was initiated within 30 kilometers in each year. The figures show the absence of a positive differences
in the outcome between the municipalities treated in 1924 or before and those treated right after.
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Figure 13: Absence of a Link between the New Towns and Voter Turnout
Notes: The figure shows the estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from a set of regressions
of the electoral turnout in each year on the log of the distance to the New Towns. All regressions include
baseline controls.
D The Timing of the Treatment: Empirical
Model
Consider the model given by24
FP24 = ↵ + D(1923−24) + D(1925−26) + ✏ (2)
Where FP24 is the share of votes for the Fascist Party in 1924 in each
municipality (subscript omitted), D(1923−24) is an indicator variable that
takes value one if a New Town was built within a given range (for in-
stance, 30 kilometers) from each municipality between 1923 and 1924,
whileD(1925−26) takes value one if the construction started between 1925
and 1926, thus right after the 1924 elections.
The parameter   measures the difference in the electoral support for
the Fascist Party in the 1924 elections in the municipalities treated right
before the elections relative to the control group. The parameter   mea-
sures the support for the fascists in 1924 from the municipalities treated
after the elections, relative to the control group. In other words, the pa-
rameter   is a measure of the selection bias associated with the location
24 For ease of exposition, but without loss of generality, I do not consider control vari-
ables.
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of the New Towns. To see this point, consider the case in which the loca-
tions of the New Towns took place in areas that already exhibited larger
support for the Fascist Party. Then, the estimated   would be positive.
In cotntrast, if the location of the New Towns was chosen so as to tar-
get places that exhibited lower support for the Fascist Party, then the
estimate of   would be positive.
To derive the estimated model of equation (1), I add and subtract
 D(1923−24) to the right hand side of equation (2). The result comes from
noting that D(1923−24) +D(1925−26) =D(1923−26) and defining   ≡ (  − ).
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E Data Description, Sources, and Variables
Definitions
Table E14: Summary statistics for major municipality-level vari-
ables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Neo FP ’53 0.044 0.049 0 0.513 7199
Neo FP ’83 0.049 0.033 0 0.373 7987
Neo FP ’87 0.045 0.03 0 0.493 7981
Neo FP ’58 0.032 0.036 0 0.489 7248
Neo FP ’63 0.035 0.037 0 0.456 7242
Neo FP ’76 0.042 0.035 0 0.416 7963
Neo FP ’79 0.037 0.029 0 0.357 7964
Neo FP ’48 0.017 0.035 0 0.727 7088
Neo FP ’92 0.04 0.03 0 0.425 8002
Neo FP ’72 0.055 0.047 0 0.474 7894
Neo FP ’68 0.029 0.032 0 0.466 7936
FP ’21 0.168 0.201 0 1 3712
FP ’24 0.599 0.279 0 1 3654
Ln (Dist. to NT) 3.91 0.830 -1.076 5.33 8005
Ln Population 1921 7.845 0.974 4.06 13.555 7450
Ln Population 1931 8.012 0.962 4.804 13.96 6849
Ln Population 1951 7.952 1.036 4.304 14.317 7471
Malaria Prevalence in 1870 0.301 0.459 0 1 8007
Distance Major Urban Centers 28268.206 15815.117 0 209798.172 8007
Market Access 1921 171315.072 41531.94 53508.183 344320.129 7762
Caloric Suitability Index 4185.136 777.022 0 5636.359 8007
Land Suitability for Wheat 733.947 482.992 0 2180 8002
Notes: Neo FP and FP are the share of votes for the Neo-Fascist Party and the Fascist Party, respec-
tively. FP ’21 refers to the share of votes for the Fascist Party’s coalition in 1921. Ln (Dist. to NT) is
the log of the distance to the closest New Town.
E.1 Measures of Political and Cultural Values
Preference for Fascism: Based on the answer to the question “There
are groups of people whose opinions many people do not like. For each
of these groups, tell me if you think they should be allowed or forbid-
den to publicly manifest. How do you think, for example, regarding the
fascists?” taken from the survey ITANES Panel 2001-2006, wave 2004.
Coded 1 if “Permit” and 0 if “Prohibited”.
Preference for Communism: Based on the answer to the question
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“There are groups of people whose opinions many people do not like.
For each of these groups, tell me if you think they should be allowed or
forbidden to publicly manifest. How do you think, for example, regard-
ing the communists?” taken from the survey ITANES Panel 2001-2006,
wave 2004. Coded 1 if “Permit” and 0 if “Prohibited”.
Preference for the President of the Republic: Based on the answer
to the question “There are groups of people whose opinions many peo-
ple do not like. For each of these groups, tell me if you think they should
be allowed or forbidden to publicly manifest. How do you think, for ex-
ample, regarding who manifests against the President of the Republic?”
taken from the survey ITANES Panel 2001-2006, wave 2004. Coded 1 if
“Permit” and 0 if “Prohibited”.
Preference for Homosexuals: Based on the answer to the question
“There are groups of people whose opinions many people do not like.
For each of these groups, tell me if you think they should be allowed or
forbidden to publicly manifest. How do you think, for example, regard-
ing the homosexuals?” taken from the survey ITANES Panel 2001-2006,
wave 2004. Coded 1 if “Permit” and 0 if “Prohibited”.
Preference for the Pope: Based on the answer to the question “There
are groups of people whose opinions many people do not like. For each
of these groups, tell me if you think they should be allowed or forbidden
to publicly manifest. How do you think, for example, regarding who
manifests against the Pope?” taken from the survey ITANES Panel 2001-
2006, wave 2004. Coded 1 if “Permit” and 0 if “Prohibited”.
Preference for Muslims: Based on the answer to the question ”There
are groups of people whose opinions many people do not like. For each
of these groups, tell me if you think they should be allowed or forbid-
den to publicly manifest. How do you think, for example, regarding the
Muslims?” taken from the survey ITANES Panel 2001-2006, wave 2004.
Coded 1 if “Permit” and 0 if “Prohibited”.
Preference for National Unity: Based on the answer to the question
“There are groups of people whose opinions many people do not like.
For each of these groups, tell me if you think they should be allowed or
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forbidden to publicly manifest. How do you think, for example, regard-
ing who wants the secession of the North from the rest of Italy?” Coded
1 if “Permit” and 0 if “Prohibited”.
Preference for Racists: Based on the answer to the question “There
are groups of people whose opinions many people do not like. For each
of these groups, tell me if you think they should be allowed or forbid-
den to publicly manifest. How do you think, for example, regarding the
racists?” taken from the survey ITANES Panel 2001-2006, wave 2004.
Coded 1 if “Permit” and 0 if “Prohibited”.
Stronger Leader: Based on the answer to the question: “Now, I shall
read some opinions often people hold on politics and economics. Please,
tell me how much do you agree with each of them? Today Italy needs
a stronger leader.” Taken from the survey ITANES 2001 C6.8. Coded 0
if “Disagree completely”, 1 if “ Agree a little”, 2 if “Agree fairly”, and 3
if “Agree completely”. The variable is also based on the question from
ITANES 2008 “Now, I am going to read some opinions on politics and
the economy that people sometimes express. Could you please tell me
how much do you agree (not at all, a little, fairly much, very much) with
each of them? Italy needs a strong leader nowadays” question D007 03.
Coded 0 if “not at all”, 1 if “a little” 2 if “fairly much”, and 3 if “very
much”.
Immigrants are a Threat to Identity/Culture: Based on the answer to
the question: “Now, I shall read some opinions often people hold on pol-
itics and economics. Please, tell me howmuch do you agree with each of
them? Immigrants are a threat to our culture and identity.” Taken from
the survey ITANES 2001 C10.7. Coded 0 if “Disagree completely”, 1 if “
Agree a little”, 2 if “Agree fairly”, and 3 if “Agree completely”. The vari-
able is also based on the question from ITANES 2008 “Now, I am going
to read some opinions on politics and the economy that people some-
times express. Could you please tell me how much do you agree (not at
all, a little, fairly much, very much) with each of them? Immigrants are
a threat to our culture ” question D007 10. Coded 0 if “not at all”, 1 if
“a little” 2 if “fairly much”, and 3 if “very much”.
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Immigrants are a Threat to Employment: Based on the answer to the
question: “Now, I shall read some opinions often people hold on politics
and economics. Please, tell me how much do you agree with each of
them? Immigrants are a threat to employment.” Taken from the survey
ITANES 2001 C10.8. Coded 0 if “Disagree completely”, 1 if “ Agree
a little”, 2 if “Agree fairly”, and 3 if “Agree completely”. The variable
is also based on the question from ITANES 2008 “Now, I am going to
read some opinions on politics and the economy that people sometimes
express. Could you please tell me how much do you agree (not at all,
a little, fairly much, very much) with each of them? Immigrants are a
threat to Italians? employment” question D007 11. Coded 0 if “not at
all”, 1 if “a little” 2 if “fairly much”, and 3 if “very much”.
Table E15: Summary Statistics, Individual Survey Data (2004).
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Fascists 0.475 0.5 0 1 1455
Muslims 0.547 0.498 0 1 1455
Homosexuals 0.621 0.485 0 1 1455
Communists 0.699 0.459 0 1 1455
Against the President 0.478 0.5 0 1 1455
Against the Pope 0.391 0.488 0 1 1455
North \ South Divide 0.412 0.492 0 1 1455
Racists 0.302 0.459 0 1 1455
Notes: Individual Survey Data from ITANES 2004. Based on the answer to the question “There
are groups of people whose opinions many people do not like. For each of these groups, tell me
if you think they should be allowed or forbidden to publicly manifest. How do you think, for
example, regarding the ...?” taken from the survey ITANES Panel 2001-2006, wave 2004. Coded 1
if “Permit” and 0 if “Prohibited”
Voted for the Neo-Fascist Party: Based on the answer to the ques-
tion “As you may know, in 1994 there was a big change in the Italian
political system: some old parties disappeared or changed their names.
Can you please tell me for which of the following old parties you voted
at least once and for which you never voted? Movimento sociale ital-
iano.” Coded 1 if “ At least once” and 0 if “Never”. From ITANES 2001,
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Table E16: Cross-correlation table, Individual Survey Data (2004)
Variables Against Against Divide
Fascists Muslims Homosexuals Communists the President the Pope Racists North from South
Fascists 1.000
Muslims 0.429 1.000
Homosexuals 0.383 0.542 1.000
Communists 0.527 0.494 0.481 1.000
Against the President 0.443 0.411 0.440 0.436 1.000
Against the Pope 0.427 0.484 0.439 0.412 0.649 1.000
Racists 0.528 0.388 0.347 0.347 0.452 0.481 1.000
Divide North from South 0.436 0.352 0.361 0.339 0.450 0.450 0.445 1.000
Notes: See Appendix for variables definition and sources. All correlation coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level.
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question E4.
Father/Mother Voted for the Neo-Fascist Party: Based on the an-
swer to the question “Did your father tend to vote for a specific party?
Which one? And your mother?” Coded 1 if “Msi”, and 0 otherwise. From
ITANES 2001, question E2.
Table E17: Summary Statistics, Individual Survey Data (2001).
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Voted for N.F. Party 0.157 0.364 0 1 2729
Father voted for NFP 0.083 0.276 0 1 1890
Mather voted for NFP 0.046 0.208 0 1 1890
Same Region as Father at the age of 14 0.814 0.389 0 1 2729
Male Dummy 0.494 0.5 0 1 2729
Age 50.357 15.451 27 96 2729
Married Dummy 0.684 0.465 0 1 2729
Number of Children 1.476 1.241 0 9 2729
Years of Education 9.548 4.249 0 17 2729
No Employed 0.503 0.5 0 1 2729
Salary Job 0.701 0.458 0 1 2729
Self-Employed 0.264 0.441 0 1 2729
Atypical Job 0.034 0.182 0 1 2729
Works in Agriculture 0.091 0.287 0 1 2729
Works in Industry 0.329 0.47 0 1 2729
Works in Services 0.297 0.457 0 1 2729
Works in Public Administration 0.257 0.437 0 1 2729
Head of Household in Agriculture 0.012 0.109 0 1 2729
Head of Household in Industry 0.059 0.236 0 1 2729
Head of Household in Services 0.06 0.237 0 1 2729
Head of Household in Public Administration 0.045 0.207 0 1 2729
Father in Agriculture when Respondent was 14 0.235 0.424 0 1 2729
Father in Industry when Respondent was 14 0.311 0.463 0 1 2729
Father in Services when Respondent was 14 0.154 0.361 0 1 2729
Father in Public Admin. when Respondent was 14 0.153 0.36 0 1 2729
Notes: Individual survey data from ITANES 2001. First three variables are based on the answer to the
question ”Have you ever voted for the MSI?”, ”Have your father ever voted for the MSI?”, ”Have your
mother ever voted for the MSI?”.
E.2 Municipality-level Variables
Log of the distance to the New Towns. The natural logarithm of the
distance, in kilometers, between the centroid of the municipality and the
closest New Town whose construction (i) has been ascertained; and (ii)
took place during the Fascist period.
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Electoral support for the Fascist Party in 1921. The Fascist Party
took part to the 1921 elections as a part of larger political entities (i.e.
lists). I measure the 1921 popular support for the Fascist Party by em-
ploying the share of votes for such lists. Such lists are indicated in the
volume Statistica delle Elezioni Generali Politiche per la XXVI Legislatura
(15 Maggio 1921), Ministero dell’Economia Nazionale - Direzione Gen-
erale di Statistica, 1924; and in Leoni (1971). More specifically, the fol-
lowing political parties belong to the Fascists: Fasci Italiani di Combatti-
mento, Partito Fascista. Moreover, as explained in (Leoni, 1971, p. 276)
and the above-mentioned Ministry of Economics’ volume, the Fascists
were part of the lists Blocco Nazionale and Alleanza Nazionale. In ad-
dition, the Ministry of Economics’ volume, at page XL, indicates that
the Fascists were also in the lists that were characterized by the emblem
of Fascism (the so called fascio littorio) in their symbol. By manually
searching through the lists’ symbols of the volume, I find that the follow-
ing lists are characterized by the Fascist emblem: Blocco Costituzionale,
Blocco di Difesa Nazionale, Unione Nazionale (but only in Roma, Padova,
Treviso, and not in Catanzaro, Zara, Catania — the results do not de-
pend on this finer distinction), Fascio Democratico, Blocco Democratico,
Concentrazione Liberale di Belluno, Concentrazione Liberale Udinese, Blocco
Nazionale Triestino, Blocco Nazionale Istriano. I measure the popular sup-
port for the Fascist Party in the elections of 1921 by employing the sum
of the share of votes for all of such lists in each municipality.
Caloric Suitability Index. The index is a measure of suitability for
agriculture based on the average potential agricultural output (mea-
sured in calories) across productive crops by cell of size 5’×5’. Data
source:Galor and O¨zak (2014), Galor and O¨zak (2015). I calculate the
average Caloric Suitability across the grid cells within each municipal-
ity using ArcGIS.
Suitability for wheat production. Wheat potential yield per hectare
from the FAO GAEZ’ v3 methodology with low inputs and rain-fed con-
ditions. I calculate the average wheat suitability across the grid cells
within each municipality using ArcGIS.
Malaria in 1870. Digitizedmap of malaria prevalence in Italy in 1870
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from Torelli (1882), see figure 1. The variable takes value one if the
centroid of the municipality is less than 5 kilometers away frommalarial
zones.
Distance to Major Urban Centers. distance between the centroid of
the municipality and the closest provincial capital as of 2011 calculated
in kilometers.
Market Access. For each municipality i, market access is given by
P
j,i
Popj
di,j
, where Popj is the population in municipality j and di,j is the
distance between municipality i and j (Harris, 1954b).
New Fascist Province 1927. A dummy taking value one if the munic-
ipality is within one of the 17 provinces created by the Fascist Regime
in 1927, Gorizia, Matera, Nuoro, Pescara, Pistoia, Ragusa, Rieti, Savona,
Terni, Varese, Vercelli, Viterbo. Source: Regio Decreto Legislativo del 2
gennaio 1927 n. 1.
Malaria Suitability.Temperature suitability for Plasmodium falci-
parum transmission from Gething et al. (2011), averaged within the bor-
der of each municipality. The temperature data used was a time series
across an average year (1950-2000) for every approximately 1km.
Median Elevation. Median elevation in the municipality calculated
using ArcGIS software. Data source: Global 30 Arc-Second Elevation
(GTOPO30).
Standard Deviation of Elevation. Standard deviation of elevation in
the municipality calculated using ArcGIS software. Data source: Global
30 Arc-Second Elevation (GTOPO30).
Elevation range. Difference between the maximum and the mini-
mum elevation in the municipality. Data source: ISTAT.
Distance to water. Minimum distance to the coastline and rivers.
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